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EDITORIAL

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND MODERN PROBLEMS

WE have reviewed recently in THEOLOGY two sets of Gifford Lectures—Dr. Gore's and Professor Taylor's—dealing with the nature and basis of Christian morality. We propose to say something today about another and no less striking contribution to the discussion of the same subject—namely, Dr. Inge's *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*.^{*} It is in every way a remarkable book, whether we have regard to the range and variety of its learning, the force and fervour of its defence of Christian moral principles, or to the impression of justice of judgment which the author leaves on the mind even in his most controversial passages. We do not mean that we agree with all his judgments or admit that they are always fair: but of his steadfast desire to be just no candid reader, we think, can entertain any doubts.

Dr. Inge's approach to the subject differs greatly from that of Professor Taylor or Dr. Gore in being predominantly historical. His Platonism provides, of course, a philosophical thread running through the whole work: but there is nothing comparable to the Introduction to Lecky's *History of European Morals*—a book often recalled to mind in these pages; he assumes rather than proves the intuitive basis of moral judgment and the validity of the inner light. And he may justly claim to have given his reasons for this assumption in many other books. He would perhaps also claim that the cleavage between the intuitive and utilitarian theories of ethics is not as final as is sometimes supposed. When utility is spoken of, we have to ask the question, "Utility for what?" And there will obviously be the world of difference in the answers, according as there is, or is not, a belief in a spiritual kingdom, behind and beyond this world, to which man's life is meant to be conformed. The

^{*} Hodder and Stoughton. 1930. 15s.

existence of such a kingdom Dr. Inge regards as the great principle shared in common by Platonism and Christianity; the revelation of its character—of the ethical content, that is to say, which we give to the word “spiritual”—is one of the great fruits of the Incarnation.

Perhaps the reviewer's best course in discussing a book of this kind is to pick out certain salient features for comment and criticism, and concentrate upon these. “I have ventured,” writes the Dean, “to call it an omission in the original Gospel that it paid so little attention to social reform.” It may be questioned whether he has not also answered this criticism himself in his discussion of “The Ethics of the New Testament”; as, for instance, when he notes that Christ “complained, not that wealth was badly distributed, but that it was grossly overvalued,” and that His concern was not with environment, but with character. But there is undoubtedly truth in the statement that “it is only a long view of history that is likely to be comforting, and the ancients had no long views.” And Christianity was, no doubt, a child of its time in being unable to envisage any calculable future for mankind. And yet it may be seriously questioned whether they were not really better off than we are. In regard to the past, at any rate, the Christian Church possessed in the Old Testament the record of a far longer and more significant past than any other community. They were conscious both of a history and of a philosophy of history. And that is just what the modern world, which prides itself on its detachment from the Bible, tends to lack. It is *déraciné*. Its historical consciousness begins with the Industrial Revolution: all that came before is confusion and darkness. The Church alone preserves that sense of historical continuity which is the essential background of a strong and stable life.

Again, is it so certain that we shall do future generations much good by thinking about them? It is true that we know far more than our ancestors about heredity and the biological laws to which human life, on its physical side, is subject: but the incalculable in the future is still far greater than the calculable. If man is in part self-determined, then history concerns his moral life far more than biology; and, unless he learns to serve God, who does exist, he will hardly learn how to serve the unborn, who do not. This is not to say that the population problem, to which Dr. Inge devotes one of his most powerful sections, is not real and important. But it does perhaps help us to see

that problem in proportion. We doubt, for instance, whether it is in any sense, as Dr. Inge maintains, a quantitative problem. The pressure of population on the means of subsistence seems to derive its terrors almost wholly from the assumption that the means of subsistence are limited. But are they? Modern science, with its large-scale farming, cold storage, and quick transport, has shown us during the last century how the population of the British Isles could treble itself and yet be better fed than before. Nor is its last word spoken. We understand that experiments have shown that the yield of an acre sown with wheat can be immensely increased by means of electro-magnetism; and we may confidently expect that, in one way or another, an increasing population would find means to exact increasing food from Mother Earth.

The qualitative problem, on the other hand, is without question real and urgent. We agree with Dr. Inge that "the birth-rate is chiefly determined by deliberate choice": the appalling statistics which he gives as to the practices of infanticide in ancient times and of abortion in more recent days go far to prove it; and the last named at any rate has had a good deal to do with the conversion of public opinion to "birth control." But, as he says, it is just where control of births is most needed that it most breaks down: families are largest in the slums, and largest of all among mental defectives. His own remedy—to penalize large families in such cases by some kind of special tax on children above a certain number—seems to us quite impracticable; for the parents in question are almost always the most indigent members of society. We agree, however, that some action is urgently necessary. Much, of course, is already being done by the segregation of the feeble-minded at an early age; and in society as a whole eugenic considerations of a rough-and-ready kind before marriage are probably much more widespread today than was the case a generation ago. But the issue is double-edged: it is just as necessary to encourage fertility in the higher* levels of society as to discourage it in the lower. And this question is at once moral and economic—moral, inasmuch as there is a widespread selfishness in regard to having children which only a change of heart and spirit can overcome; economic, in that our social system, and not least the allocation of the burdens of paying for it, interpose crushing obstacles in the way of large families. The moral problem must be dealt with largely by the Church; and,

* We do not mean by this the leisured and professional classes: there is a real aristocracy among the skilled artisans and the peasants.

now that the Lambeth Conference has given a liberal decision on the subject of birth control, we should like to see the Bishops follow it up with vigorous Pastoral Letters on the duty of parenthood. The "standard of living" so often pleaded as an excuse for refusing it is little more than the "Mammon" of our Lord's teaching masquerading in modern dress. There are few people who could not quite profitably live a simpler life. The economic problem, on the other hand, can only be dealt with by the State; and here we see no hope of any solution except through a radical change in the Constitution. The disfranchisement of a large proportion of the electorate which is sometimes recommended is not practicable; for a nation, like an individual, must abide by its mistakes. But a similar result could be attained by such a reform of Parliament as would give to a Second Chamber, constituted on a much smaller franchise, powers, and especially financial powers, of equal weight to those of the House of Commons. We believe that a policy which had that aim is one on which all who have at heart the higher interests of society could unite; and that their united efforts would succeed in bringing it about.

There is one further point, of a quite different kind, to which reference must be made. We have already said that Dr. Inge's approach to his subject is mainly historical; and a whole chapter is devoted to that distortion of original Christianity which he calls "Theocratic Imperialism." This chapter has evidently caused him some uneasiness, as the conclusion of the book bears witness. Yet we do not think that his exposure of the character of the Latin Church is undeserved or unfair. Historically, his judgment as to the mediæval Church being the continuator of Roman Imperialism rather than of Christ's institution coincides with Creighton's; when Hildebrand claims "that the priests of Christ are the fathers and masters (*magistri*) of all kings and princes," we have the express teaching of our Lord directly and flatly repudiated. Nor can there be any extenuation of the appalling moral corruption to which at various times the Roman curia has sunk. And yet we have a criticism, and one to which we attach great importance, to make of the Dean's treatment of Catholicism. It is his unwillingness to admit the fact of a Catholicism—a Church type of Christianity, that is to say—which is not necessarily Roman. This is surprising for more than one reason; for he pays generous tribute to Catholic doctrinal literature, and his discussion of divorce shows plainly that he is alive to the necessity of some external discipline of its members by the Church. And it is precisely the claim of the

Church of England, not to speak of the Orthodox Church and (in part, at least) the Church of Sweden, that they do embody a Catholicism which is free from the imperialistic principles and methods of the Latin Church. We would go further, indeed, and say that in this country the moral tradition of Christianity has been handed down more effectually by the Church of England than by any other agency, or perhaps even by all others together. Dr. Inge would possibly admit this; but, if it be true, much that is written in this book should be given a different emphasis. The Church's life of devotion and discipline will then be seen disentangled from the hierarchical abuses which have so often dishonoured it; and the institutional side of religion will be regarded, not as the enemy of Christian morality, but as its indispensable bulwark and safeguard.

We cannot, however, close our observations on this book on a note of criticism. Dr. Inge is one of those few writers whose spiritual earnestness and loftiness of purpose quicken the pulse both of intellect and of conscience, and stimulate to worthy endeavour. His love for God in Christ is not the less apparent because he does not often speak of it; nor is his love for his fellow-men less real because it is often clothed in words of irony or criticism. He is of those who regard speaking the truth, even though it be unpalatable, as among the highest kinds of service that the theologian can render to God or to man; and it is this which makes him today one of the best-loved figures in this Church and realm.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF LIBERTY

SYNOPSIS

I

WHY should there be a specifically Christian idea of liberty? Ideas come through reflection on experience, and our experience of imperfection leads to an act of faith in the existence of divine perfection. If Christianity opens the door to a deeper experience of sharing in the divine life of perfect liberty, it will give the Christian an opportunity of forming an especially valuable idea of liberty, in which the best contemporary ideas of freedom will be verified and deepened. This is what Christianity claims to do in every age, and the lives of Christ and of St. Paul illustrate the way in which experience of liberty gave birth to the Christian idea of it.

II

Human beings are the self-conscious subjects of organisms which are constituted by their relationships to one another and to whatever further environment there be. Each man comes into existence as the subject of an already living body, and human life is the opportunity for growth in freedom by bringing this life under purposive control. Experience shows two fundamental laws in this process: (1) That freedom from external compulsion is of less importance than freedom from internal incapacity, and (2) that acts which our moral insight approves promote freedom, while those which it disapproves destroy it. Nevertheless, one must not regard freedom from external compulsion as unimportant without qualification.

A man's relationships to the world around him are both passive and active. As passive, his freedom is expressed in the determination of his modes of response to the events that happen to him. Growth in freedom is marked by a growing power to welcome and harmonize a variety of interests. On the active side, growth in freedom implies a growing power to control the environment, and this requires growth in self-forgetfulness. The three great obstacles to growth in freedom, both passive and active, are inertia, selfishness, and ignorance.

III

Human freedom has no secure home except in a theistic philosophy, a fact overlooked by some exponents of "humanism." Nevertheless, the "humanists" rightly emphasize the truth that our freedom (though derived) is real freedom, our creative activity (though delegated) genuinely creative. Christian liberty is the liberty of men adopted in Christ to share in the divine freedom. This is the ground of the correspondence between growth in goodness and growth in freedom.

Hence liberty is ours *for a purpose*; it is only discovered in so far as we are seeking to find and do God's will. Here Christian experience verifies and deepens Plato's doctrine of the *εργον*. The study of God's self-revelation in past and present, personal communion with God, and consistency in practice, are the modes of growing in conformity with God's will and so in freedom. The idea of Christian liberty springs from the

experience of men who have been called by God in Christ to explore this way of life.

The recognition that liberty is ours for the performance of objective duty makes clear the distinction between liberty and licence. Moreover, to think of membership in the Church as primarily conferring freedom for God's service rather than freedom from damnation distinguishes the idea of freedom from that of self-indulgence, and enables the Christian honestly to respect the liberty of thought of non-Christians.

IV

Through growing experience of "the Inner Life" the Christian learns that freedom comes through self-surrender to God's will, since God wills the surrendered soul to grow by making his own decisions in the world and taking responsibility for them. Growth in liberty is illustrated by the experience of freedom from sin and fear, and in the control of thoughts.

Liberty in social relationships also depends upon the objective reference to God's will; but it must be remembered that God's will is revealed in various situations through the insight of qualified men—artists, scientists, etc. This may be illustrated by reference to problems of marriage, family life, citizenship, etc. But since mankind is growing in freedom, at any stage of unperfected growth it may happen that perfect liberty cannot be enjoyed by all parties concerned. When the grounds for this are understood, it should be possible to acquiesce in restrictions of liberty without rancour or bitterness. Out of such conflicts is born a future wherein freedom can be more fully realized. These conflicts occur in the Church in matters both of faith and conduct.

The Christian idea of liberty rests upon the Christian conviction that through membership in Christ both individual and society grow into their true selves. The Church is engaged in experimentally verifying the truth of this idea, and deeds must come before words.

I

"The Christian Idea of Liberty" is a phrase that falls readily from the tongue; but when one pauses to ask whether there is, or why there should be, some especially Christian idea, different from other ideas of liberty, a question is raised over which some time must be spent before the discussion can move forward again. "Liberty is liberty," it will be said, "and whether it be contemplated by Christian or pagan makes no difference. It is not what Christians think about liberty that matters, but what liberty really is." This is true, and if Christians claim to have some especially valuable idea of liberty, that implies a claim to occupy a position from which it is possible to see with especial clearness what liberty truly is.

On its cognitive side the human mind is primarily an instrument for becoming aware of things. In the ordinary process of learning three factors contribute to growth in knowledge: (1) the object to be known must be presented to the mind;

(2) the object must be well placed and lighted, and the observer's standpoint must be such that it gives the best view for the purpose in hand; and (3) progress will largely depend on the extent to which the observer's mind has been equipped by previous training and learning to appreciate the significance of what he sees. For instance, a child learning to read must (1) have letters and words placed before him, and (2) himself be seated where he can see the blackboard, and, if necessary, wear spectacles. Moreover, (3) until he knows that CAT spells cat, and has tumbled downstairs, it is no use his trying to make head or tail of "catastrophe."

Thus we learn about the things of sense which surround us here on earth. But besides this directly cognitive activity of the mind we use our imagination, laughing about Cheshire cats and shivering at the thought of unmentionable catastrophes. In this realm of fancy we learn to distinguish between three classes: (a) things which do exist, only we have never seen them for ourselves (actualities); (b) things which might exist, only, so far as we know, they don't (non-actual possibilities); and (c) things which don't and can't exist (impossibilities). What we call sanity largely depends on rightly drawing the boundaries between these three divisions of the realm.

Somewhere in this department of the mind's activities lie those intuitions of perfection which play so large a part in the shaping of our lives. Our experience of imperfect knowledge enables us to imagine what perfect knowledge would be if we had it—so much so that we criticize various states of mind as being imperfect approximations towards that knowledge which we have never experienced. Our acceptance of it as the criterion shows that we accept it as a non-experienced actuality. This acceptance remains, so to speak, "up in the air" until it is incorporated into such a philosophical system as theism. As an element in theistic faith it makes full confession of its own nature, and can face the world with a good conscience.

Our ideas of liberty are of this kind. We have enough experience of freedom to know that our freedom is very imperfect. We form ideas of what perfect freedom would be if we had it, and some of us believe as a matter of faith that such freedom does exist as an element in the eternal being of God.

If this analysis of how we form our ideas of freedom be correct, it is clear that the deeper and truer a man's actual experience of freedom here and now, the deeper and truer will be his idea of God's eternal and perfect freedom. But there is yet another point to be considered. One of the grounds of our belief in the reality of divine perfection is the fact that, so far from being merely a passive imaginary construct formed from our experience

of imperfection, it can exercise an actively controlling influence over our developing experience and ideas. In the growth of ideas of freedom there is a mutuality of influence between growing depth of actual experience in the imperfect and growing depth of insight into the nature of the perfect. Each helps on the other.

The Christian claim to have an especially valuable idea of liberty thus involves the twofold claim (1) to have an especially rich experience of actual freedom here and now, and (2) to be profiting by opportunities for especially deep insight into the life of God. Here (as everywhere) deeds must come before words, experience before ideas. The objective is prior to the subjective.

Furthermore, any one particular idea does not grow in isolation, but in the context of all our other experience and of all the ideas to which it gives rise. Throughout there is going on the interaction of actual experience with the intuitions of perfection, whether these latter are recognized as revelations of God or not. For God (to use St. Paul's language) has not left Himself without witness among the Gentiles. In other words, the Christian's faith in God provides him not with the negation but with the interpretation of the ideas of those who do not share it. All growth in knowledge is clearer apprehension through experience of that perfection which God is in process of revealing to man.

If this outlook of the Christian is justified, then at any period of the development of Christian thought one would expect to find that the truly Christian idea of liberty is the best contemporary idea of it, verified and deepened through Christian experience. Christianity is not primarily the proclamation of a message in words, but the manifestation of a life in deeds. As Professor Whitehead has put it in his illuminating comparison of Christianity with Buddhism: "Buddhism is the most colossal example in history of applied metaphysics; Christianity took the opposite road. It has always been a religion seeking a metaphysic, in contrast to Buddhism, which is a metaphysic generating a religion. . . . Christianity . . . starts with a tremendous notion about the world. But this notion is not derived from a metaphysical doctrine, but from our comprehension of the sayings and actions of certain supreme lives. It is the genius of the religion to point at the facts and ask for their systematic interpretation. In the Sermon on the Mount, in the Parables, and in their accounts of Christ, the Gospels exhibit a tremendous fact. The doctrine may, or may not, lie on the surface. But what is primary is the religious fact. . . . Buddhism makes itself probable by referring to its metaphysical theory. Christianity makes itself probable by referring to

supreme religious moments in history. . . . Buddhism starts with the elucidatory dogmas. Christianity starts with the elucidatory facts."*

The aim of this essay is to present in outline the Christian idea of liberty as today verifying and deepening contemporary thought on the subjects involved, and lack of space makes it impossible to attempt any historical survey of this relationship in the past. Nevertheless, a word or two must be said about it at the time of the first impact of Christianity upon the world. A brief consideration of this will help, I hope, both to make clear the point of view that I have been trying to express and also to justify it.

The principle of "Deeds before words" has always inspired the Catholic mind in studying the Gospel records of our Lord's life. The Church has never found it satisfactory to regard Him as merely the source of valuable teaching. What He was and did underlie what He said. So in the early centuries of Christianity it was impossible for His followers, as they tried to live according to His teaching, to avoid facing the question of His Person; and the inevitability of this development has recently been shown by its repetition in the history of New Testament study. A half-century or so ago the tendency was prominent to regard our Lord as a teacher whose sole importance lay in the value of His message. But further study of that message has shown that an integral element in it was a claim on His part to a certain status in relation to God and to mankind. It was His vocation, being what He was, to do the Father's will, and the doing included the teaching. The words arose out of the deed.

This is most clearly shown by Dr. Easton in his recent Hale lectures,† in which he distinguishes between two strains in Christ's teaching: the proclamation of the Fatherhood of God and that of the Kingdom of God. The teaching that God, as the Father of all men, forgives sinners upon their repentance was the proclamation of an objective fact which any prophet, so to speak, might have uttered. But the declaration that the Kingdom of God had come was another matter. This was the message that a new *power* had come into the world for the overcoming of evil, power at first and for the moment embodied in Himself, but embodied in Him in order that it might be shared by those who should hear His call and become citizens of His kingdom.

He had come, then, to share with mankind a way of life which first He lived Himself; and when we study that way of life we see that its keynote was complete devotion to the fulfil-

* *Religion in the Making* (Macmillan, 1926), pp. 50-52.

† *Christ in the Gospels* (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930), vi., vii.

ment on earth of the Father's will and constant personal communion with the Father, the combination of these issuing in habitual unerring insight as to what the Father's will might be. In this way of life the true nature of freedom shone forth as never before for those who had eyes to see. Those who had learned from seers and thinkers of the ancient world to distinguish true freedom from its counterfeit could find their ideas verified and deepened as they contemplated the paradox of the cross:

*"Impleta sunt quæ concinit
David fideli carmine,
Dicens: in nationibus
Regnavit a ligno Deus."*

That which Christ had come to do we can see finding some of its fulfilment in St. Paul. He had to find liberty before he could speak of liberty, and the liberty he found came from being baptized into Christ, so that he shared His relationship to the Father and His way of life on earth. For him, as for us all, surrender of the self to God is not completed in a single act, but through the process of a lifetime. As his devotion to God, his personal communion with God, and his practical insight into the will of God were all imperfect, so too were his practical experience of freedom and his theoretical insight into its nature. But in so far as he outstripped any or all of his fellow-men in these respects, both then and now, to that extent it is possible to find in his life and teaching the verification and the deepening of what man had hitherto discovered of the true nature of liberty.

It would be interesting at this point to collate the discoveries of the ancient world as to the nature of freedom, and to work out in detail from the Gospels and Epistles the manner in which the idea is developed through deeper actual experience of that which men had imagined and pursued. But our task is concerned with the parallel situation of today, and if anything more is to be said of the idea of liberty in the New Testament it must be by way of incidental reference as we go along.

II

It is characteristic of present-day thought to lay emphasis on the fact that, although "the world is full of a number of things," those things only exist in relation to one another as "knots," more or less complicated by their evolutionary development, in the continuum of spatio-temporal reality. The individual thing is not something made by itself and then placed in the environment of the other things; it is a focal point at

which a number of forces converge, intermingle after a certain pattern, and are sent forth to further adventure of a similar sort. Nevertheless these "knots," woven of transient relationships, undoubtedly have each a certain uniqueness and substantiality, a power of actively maintaining a specific pattern, and weaving together in accordance with it the forces which impinge from round about.

In the course of their development from sub-atomic modes of existence to that of human beings these creatures exhibit greater and greater complexity of structure and individuality. There comes an awareness in the individual consciousness of its own existence in relation to its environment, and man comes to think of himself as to some extent a free being. However much he may be a focal point at which the forces impinging upon him are rearranged before issuing forth again, he does not feel himself to be merely a passive medium wherein this rearrangement is effected entirely apart from his own choices and decisions. It is true that to a large extent he is just this. His bodily organism was functioning in this way long before there was any conscious "he" to claim and exercise any control in the process, and that control is only in process of being established during the span of human life on earth. He is in process of transition from the unfree life of the sub-human creature towards the achievement of a freedom of which as yet he has very imperfect experience.* Still, the human race has been engaged in this pursuit long enough to have discovered certain laws which obtain in this sphere, of which two are especially important. In the first place it has become clear that freedom from external compulsion is of less importance than freedom from internal self-slavery. This is a truth which often needs to be rediscovered, for it is only gradually that man learned the comparative unimportance of the lesser kind of freedom; and the individual must learn to see for himself the wisdom garnered by the race. The undergraduate who discovers that his own inability to get out of bed in the morning is a more serious slavery than the College regulation which requires him to be within doors at midnight has not entirely wasted his opportunities of higher education. Secondly, it has become clear that there are certain lines of action which promote the higher freedom and others which destroy it, and that this distinction is identical with the moral distinction between right and wrong. If anyone has not learned these two lessons, he will probably find it a waste of time to read the rest of this essay until he has done so.

* In this paragraph I am attempting very briefly to summarize conclusions arrived at in Essays IV. and V. of my *Essays in Christian Philosophy* (Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), to which I must refer the reader for more detailed discussion.

Not that one should be indifferent to that liberty which is freedom from external compulsion. Revolt against it may often be the expression of nobility of spirit on the part of oppressed peoples or over-mothered daughters, and indignation at the sight of a fellow-creature subjected to unjust or unnecessary constraint is a sentiment to be welcomed and cultivated, lest one should fall into the temptation to regard the development of the inner life as essentially discontinuous with that of the outer, after the manner of those who would poultice social ills by offering to sweated workers heavenly rewards for patience in earthly subservience. The point is that (other things being equal, as the saying goes) external compulsion *can* be endured without loss of the inner and more valuable freedom,* and where circumstances force upon us choice between the two, the latter must be chosen. Moreover, here on earth the acceptance of external restraint is often the necessary condition of growth in freedom. But of this more will be said later.

Let us now turn round and see where we have got to. A man is a self-conscious organism capable of exercising a certain amount of intelligent control over his relations with his environment, and life on earth is the opportunity of growing in this power of control. This growth is growth in freedom. We have seen that he stands in a double relationship to the world; as the focal point at which incoming forces intermingle and are woven together before issuing forth, he lives his life in both passive and active voice. We must consider what freedom means in either case.

On the passive side of human life it is clear that many of man's chief opportunities of exercising freedom arise from occasions where he is called upon to determine how he shall take events which occur to him. It is a commonplace, for instance, that suffering may ennoble and purify character, or may embitter and worsen it, according as it is taken. Again, the acceptance of external restraint may be in itself a deliberate expression of choice and exercise of freedom. A newly appointed English bishop was asked by one of his friends whether he would not be bold enough to give a lead to his brethren by discarding the absurd traditional costume of apron and gaiters. He replied that never to be able to open his mouth without being quoted as the trousered bishop would prevent any of his utterances being seriously judged upon their merits, and would be a severer bondage than any conformity to sartorial custom. Of course,

* Cp. "My house and ground,
My horse and hound
Are fled, and nowhere to be found;
Yet still there something in me lies
That law and lawyer's art defies."—WERGELAND.

the acceptance of external restraint may also be due to inertia, to a habit of drifting along the line of least resistance, which is the very antithesis of that growth in freedom which makes life worth while. Which of these two it is in any particular case it is often impossible for the observer to discover—and sometimes the man himself may be deceived by self-complacency or tortured by scruples on the matter. But this question of empirical fact must be kept distinct from the question of principle with which at present we are engaged. We all know the difference between grappling with circumstances and drifting before them. When acceptance is the expression of true grappling it is the exercise of freedom and promotes growth in freedom, but not otherwise.

Another important point to be considered on the passive aspect of life, that aspect which presents a man as subject to multitudinous forces impinging upon him from round about, is that he is called upon to reconcile conflicting tendencies and weave them into a harmonious pattern of life. To be a human person is to be the self-conscious subject of experiences. Apart from the content given to personality by the incoming experiences, it is but their potential recipient; human personality comes into actual existence, and grows throughout life, as the self-woven complex of its incoming experiences. For a strong growth two things are necessary: harmony and richness, unity and multiplicity. Hence arises one of the chief problems of life: how best to exercise selectivity among interests. On the one hand, the more interests one has, the richer the personality; on the other hand, character may be ruined by the conflict of distracting interests. Here again the principle must be grasped and the empirical problems be left to be solved *ambulando*; it is impossible to lay down in advance whether at any given moment a man will be best advised to admit some new interest, or to concentrate on those he already has, or to eliminate some of them. It is perhaps enough to say that growth in freedom includes growth in the capacity to welcome and unify interests. As in the case of the acceptance of restraint, it is often difficult for an observer to distinguish between the true exercise of freedom in decision and its antithesis. Self-satisfied narrow-mindedness and conscientious self-limitation may look very much alike, as also may breadth of deep interest and superficiality. As before, a man must beware of self-deception and his observers of want of charity. So far as I can see, growth in freedom will always involve the continued attempt to unify rather more interests than one's unifying capacity is at the moment competent to handle, and so long as life lasts we cannot expect to be free from strain and struggle here.

We pass by an easy transition from the passive aspect of life to the active. The control of our mode of response to the forces impinging upon us from round about involves inevitably some control over the development of the world whence they come. In limiting my interests by refusing an invitation to contribute an essay to some volume I may have been thinking of nothing except the congested state of my personal programme. Nevertheless, the volume will go forth without my essay, and its readers will escape the danger of being influenced by me. At other times a man may be directly interested in the exercise of external control, even to the extent of forgetting to think about himself in the process. Although perfection in self-forgetfulness is probably one of those perfections which we commonly aspire after rather than enjoy, there can be few men and women who have not at some time or another experienced with a thrill the possibility of its attainment. The three-quarter racing for the corner flag; the officer dying with the words, "Die hard, the Middlesex," upon his lips; the bacteriologist immersed in tracking down the secret life of some obscure germ—these and many others forbid us to indulge in that cynicism which ascribes all human activity to self-regard. Here once again, of course, it may be impossible for the observer to distinguish the self-forgetful from the self-seeking activity and extraordinarily difficult for the agent himself, reflecting on his action, to disentangle his motives and discover which was the predominant interest. But these problems only arise because of the impossibility of settling the matter once for all by denying the existence of either self-seeking or self-forgetfulness.

In the active, as in the passive aspect of life, growth of personal freedom implies the progressive extension of the area of conscious and deliberate control. For this there are three great enemies to be overcome: inertia, selfishness, and ignorance. We have behind us centuries of evolutionary development during which our response to the impinging world around us was that of passive conformity to the cosmic urge working in and through us. To be free we must rise up and assert ourselves, conquering all that in us which longs to curl up once again in the dreamless peace of our mother's womb. But the duty of self-assertion brings with it a new danger, that of becoming (like the typical Englishman in the story) "a self-made man who worships his maker." We need to find some objective cause into which we can throw ourselves, devotion to which shall take the place of devotion to self as the instrument by which our natural inertia may be overcome. Thirdly, there is ignorance—ignorance both of ends worth pursuing and of the means whereby they may be attained. It may have been a cynic who remarked that "many

a well-meaning man has entered the pulpit," but it was a valuable reminder that a besetting temptation of religious people is to undervalue the importance of intellectual advance. The bishops at Lambeth in 1930 found that they could not profitably discuss the question of contraceptives without thinking out anew the ends for which matrimony is worth conserving, and in succeeding weeks the correspondence columns of the Church papers bore eloquent testimony to the repugnance felt by many Christians towards the intellectual effort to which they were summoned by their Fathers in God. Nor is the study of means by which the world may be improved less important than that of the nature of true improvement. It is no use deploring the prevalence of social and personal ills while starving the endowment of scientific research or regarding the discoveries made therein as irrelevant to the building of the City of God on earth.

To sum up, men and women are not born free, but are born to achieve freedom. The individual comes into existence as the self-conscious subject of a bodily organism in a relation of mutual interaction with the rest of the universe. He grows by accepting responsibility for the behaviour of this organism, which is himself, and by extending his conscious deliberate control over its passive and active behaviour. Growth in freedom means growth in the power of exercising this control, for freedom is the living of life as the expression of willed intention. We have now to ask how far this idea of liberty is verified and deepened by being set in the context of the Christian faith.

III

It seems to me that if man's experience of freedom, as empirically observed, is to be described as an element in our contemporary idea of a universe, it must appear in some such form as has just been outlined. But now the question arises whether it can be accepted as a real element, and, if so, what further determinations this will require in our view of the universe as a whole.

There are many, of course, who solve the problem by denying the reality of this freedom altogether, and some carry this line of thought to its logical conclusion and deny to human individuality any ultimate status in reality. I do not wish here to add to what I have said elsewhere in criticism of these views,* but to consider a further position which has of late years achieved a certain popularity. For the thinkers I have in mind, human freedom as empirically observed is accepted as a reality, and is made the basis of a philosophy according to which man is

* In *Essays in Christian Philosophy*, IV.

engaged in creating the universe as he goes along. Sometimes describing themselves as humanists, sometimes as instrumentalists, and sometimes by other names, exponents of this general point of view exhort their fellow-men to cease from putting their trust in supernatural agencies and to realize that it is in their own hands, by the use of their own brain and brawn, to remould the world nearer to the heart's desire.

Now, supposing that we accept the humanist position on its positive side and hold that man is engaged in the creation of this time-space universe, to which activity his intelligence is to be regarded as instrumental, we have to go further and ask on what view of the ultimate nature of the universe is this position tenable. It is admitted that men arise as incidents in a temporal process, as offspring of some underlying surge of energy which functions in and through them. One has every respect for such a thinker as Mr. Wildon Carr, who has faced this problem squarely and accepted its implications, regarding human beings as natural children, casually begotten by the life-stream and destined to be destroyed by their parent when their brief day is done. Reality is the life-stream, and our little selves are transient creatures whose thinking and willing are alike devoid of absolute validity. This is an intelligible view; but an exaltation of humanity which professes to accept man's evolutionary origin, and makes no attempt to reconcile its emotional attitude towards humanity today with its intellectual theory of his past history, is a striking example of the way in which religious fervour (non-theistic as well as theistic) can blind men's eyes to the inadequacy of its intellectual foundations.

It is not always clearly perceived that in the present century the acceptance of "energy" as the ultimate reality often corresponds to the materialism of the nineteenth. So long as the energy is thought of as a blind surge and not as the embodiment of consciously intelligent will, it is no more "spiritual" for being "energy" than when it was thought of as "matter in motion." The ultimate question at issue is whether this energy, which we empirically observe as functioning throughout all creation from atom to human society, is or is not the embodiment of a conscious, intelligent mind.

It is, of course, the essence of theism to answer this question in the affirmative, and what I want to point out is that only if this is done is it possible to account for our empirical experience of freedom and to secure to it an intelligible place in the universe. That creative activity on the part of an intelligent free Being should include the impartation of a share in His freedom to some of His creatures, a delegation of truly creative activity, is an intelligible conception; whereas respect for

human freedom combined with the derivation of it from an impersonal ultimate reality is not. The humanist deification of humanity is the worship of an idol with feet of clay, and with all its well-known difficulties the Christian doctrine of creation by God is worthy of more intellectual respect than the humanist proclamation of ultimate self-creativity. There may be mysteries in the Christian faith, but they are not ultimately unintelligible mysteries which the faithful must be warned off from enquiring into.

Conviction of the ultimate intelligibility of the universe (which is the central nerve of the Christian faith on its intellectual side) involves the ascription of perfect goodness to the Being whose creative will is observed as embodied in the world of space and time. Only that which is good is self-authenticating in its intelligibility. It is easy to pour scorn on Christian attempts to wrestle with the problem of evil, and superficial thinkers, such as Mr. C. E. M. Joad and many others, are often tempted to avoid the question by failing squarely to face the fundamental problem. If the existence of evil be not fairly recognized for what it is, and yet regarded as ultimately reconcilable with the eternal reality of goodness alone, the universe is intrinsically unintelligible and all philosophy a waste of time.

There would be, there could be, no "sharing in creation" on the part of man, were not the capacity and opportunity for that sharing given to him by the eternal Creator. Our freedom is a derived freedom, given to us by God for the fulfilment of His creative will. But, so long as this is not lost sight of, we have much to learn from that contemporary recognition of the importance of the time-element in reality of which the humanist movement is one manifestation. Our freedom, though derived, is real freedom; our creative activity, though delegated, is genuinely creative. The call to use all our powers of mind and body for the intelligent betterment of creation is a real call. The Christian, of all men, can least justifiably disregard it, for to him it is the call of his Maker to co-operation in building that city whose Builder and Maker is God.

This idea of co-operation or partnership with God is given a special deepening in Christianity through the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, with their corollary of man's adoptive sonship in the divine life. We saw earlier that our Lord thought of Himself as come on earth to bring into human life a new power. As He walked on earth He did not cease to exercise those relationships with the Father and the Spirit which constitute eternally the divine social life. He lived His part under human conditions, which meant that from hour to hour and day to day He sought to find and do the Father's will

in the guidance and power of the Spirit. But that sonship which was His by nature He came to share with us by adoption, and those who are baptized into His Church are called to share with Him that life of seeking to do the Father's will in the guidance and power of the Spirit. For the practising communicant the Blessed Trinity is not an obscure mystery somewhere up in the skies; he has been adopted into sonship in that divine life, and from his place within the blessed society of Father, Son, and Spirit he looks out on the world around.

He now begins to understand the grounds of that law which hitherto was accepted as given fact, the law whereby certain ways of acting are found to promote growth in freedom and certain others to destroy it, the distinction between these corresponding to that between right and wrong. His freedom being a derived freedom, given him for the purpose of exercising his delegated power of creativity, and enriched through being put forth from within the communion of his adoptive sonship, he is not surprised to find that only as he uses his liberty to find and do the will of its Giver does he grow in his capacity for fully sharing in the life of perfect freedom.

From these considerations emerges one of the most important principles involved in the Christian idea of liberty. Freedom, even such imperfect freedom as we enjoy here and now, is ours not absolutely, but for a purpose. The Platonic doctrine of the *ἔργον*—that man's individual importance depends on his fulfilment of his vocation—is deepened and verified in Christian experience. We have seen that human freedom and human personality are closely linked and stand or fall together. It is for the fulfilment of the work to which God has called him in Christ that a Christian has the right to expect to find the Gospel promises of power and freedom fulfilled. Prior to the expectation of growth in freedom must come the surveying of the world around, with an honest attempt to find the true answer to the question: "Lord, what wouldst Thou have me to do?"

On this conviction that there is an objectivity of duty rests the Christian solution of the practical problems connected with growth in freedom. But it is important at once to assert that this conviction of objectivity does not mean that it is possible to solve in advance the problems which will arise. It means that at any given moment there is a right and a wrong answer to such questions as: "Should I accept this external restraint, or throw it off? Should I seize this opportunity of widening my interests, or reject it? Should I try to alter this state of affairs, or let well alone?" But the discovery of the right answer must be the work of the man on the spot at the time, and whether or no he will judge rightly will depend on his

qualifications for the task. As a doctor's skill in diagnosis depends on the combination of natural ability, training, and clinical experience, so is it with the diagnosis of the moral situations in our lives. Doubtless some men are naturally gifted with insight into these matters, and these will become leaders to whom their fellows will turn for spiritual counsel and advice. But all may grow by training and spiritual experience, and it is important to understand how in the Christian scheme of things that growth is promoted. There are three factors which need to be working in combination.

There is the study of the mind of God as revealed in the past, especially, of course, in the Bible. There is the study of the mind of God as revealed in the opportunities of the present, in which æsthetic vision and scientific investigation may justly claim an important place as channels of revelation. Then there is that personal communion with God the Source of all revelation, whose will it is desired to know and do. The Christian believes that in proportion as a man trains himself to develop on all these three sides he will become the kind of man who is capable of seeing his way through the moral problems of his life. There is, indeed, a fourth factor, one of so cardinal an importance that without it the other three are wasted effort. Moral insight will not grow without the honest endeavour at every stage to act in accordance with such light as one has. But this is so obvious as to go without saying. If a man wills to grow in freedom, he should turn his attention to these four points, and frame his life accordingly. Deeds come before words, and he that will understand the idea of Christian liberty must first grow in experience of the fact.

This essay began by asking what it means to speak specifically of the Christian idea of liberty, and it has now summed up the answer to that question by using the slightly different phrase, "The idea of Christian liberty." That is the keynote of what I have tried to say. All men have some experience of freedom, but except on the theistic hypothesis it is difficult to reconcile that experience with a consistent philosophical view of the universe. For the Christian, freedom has its due place in his philosophical system, and to regard life as the opportunity for growth in freedom is what gives its meaning to all our experience. The Incarnation issuing in our adoptive sonship in the Blessed Trinity increases the opportunity of such growth, and Christian experience down the centuries bears witness to the power of faith to promote it.

In the fourth and concluding section of this essay I shall attempt to give point to the foregoing somewhat abstract discussion by considering how it may be found illustrated in

certain typical examples of actual situations. But there are two points which require further emphasis before we leave the theoretical part of the argument.

The first is the connection between freedom and the Platonic doctrine of the *ἐργον* reinterpreted as the doctrine of the Father's will made known by the Spirit to those who share in Christ His sonship. In other words, this may be called the connection between freedom and the objectivity of duty. On this depends that most vital distinction between liberty and licence, between a true sharing in divine freedom and a most dangerous cult of self-expression as an end in itself. I must not demand freedom as something to which I have a justified claim in my own natural right. By nature—that is to say, by virtue of the past history of my development in the process of time—I am a “knot,” a focal point where various strains in the life-stream meet, combine, and continue on their way. My capacity for freedom and such actuality of it as I have are given to me by God for the purpose of my co-operation with Him, and the obligation to accept my life as a responsive movement towards His prior activity has been deepened by my recognition of what He has done in the Incarnation and the Church. Liberty for me is liberty for the doing of His will, and I cannot rightly think of it except in this connection. One might almost venture the paradox of saying that liberty is one of those things best achieved by forgetting about it, one of those blessings of which it is said: “Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.”

The second point I wish to stress is this: I have become more and more convinced of recent years that Christian discipleship is essentially the acceptance of an adoption into sonship for service, that the true outlook of the Christian is that of one who is looking out on the world from the point of view of God, seeking to find and do God's will. I have argued elsewhere that this is the natural corollary of an objective view of the Atonement,* and have given further reasons for the conviction in urging the unsatisfactory character of the theory that the Church is primarily the ark of salvation.† Dr. Easton's recent exposition of our Lord's teaching, already referred to, is a further argument to the same effect. That specific relationship to God in Christ which He had come to initiate through the establishment of the kingdom is not to be confused with the relationship of “being in a state of salvation,” as though the two were coterminous. God the Father forgives all who repent upon their repentance—in modern language, all those who are trying

* In *And was made Man*, pp. 89, 90, 101-105

† In *Essays in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 137-140.

to live up to the best light they have are in a state of salvation, no matter whether or no they have ever even heard of Christ. But within that wider company there are those whom He has called into His Church, upon whom there is laid a special responsibility to be making use of all the aids He has given for the one purpose of carrying on His creative work until He shall look upon this earth and human society and see that they are good.

What has this to do with the Christian idea of liberty? It is a further step towards emancipating that idea from any dangerous confusion with licence or self-seeking. The liberty of members of the Church is not their freedom from the danger of a dark hereafter destined for those without; it is the freedom from all that hampers and hinders man in the service of God in the world. Moreover, it is a step which enables us to be more sincere in our devotion to liberty, as we can with a clear conscience respect the freedom of thought of those who cannot honestly accept the Christian faith. To be able to assure such a one that the honest following of his convictions is for him the way of salvation liberates the Christian soul from what in the past has been a distressing conflict between conviction and charity. For the freedom of this liberation, given to us through the advancing study of theology, we of the twentieth century may well offer our *Te Deum*.

IV

I began the third section of this essay by arguing that our actual experience of freedom can be accounted for only by a theistic view of the relation between this time-space universe and its eternal source. I should like to begin this concluding section by calling attention to the way in which this truth appears when viewed from within the inner life of personal communion with God. The keynote of the Christian life on its inner side is self-surrender; yet that self-surrender is not to be an avoidance of the growing-pains and responsibilities of selfhood. Light comes when the Christian realizes that it is the Father's will that he should grow in selfhood by making decisions and accepting responsibilities. Divine guidance is not normally a matter of inexplicable inner urges to actions of which no reasonable account can be given, and one does well to be suspicious of the rightness of any decision for which one can give no reason except a feeling that it is God's will. There is danger of using the notion of divine guidance as a way of avoiding personal responsibility for one's actions. It is a good working rule to say that if a man is challenged as to some practical decision he

has made, he ought to be able to explain the grounds on which he acted without mentioning God at all. God's method of creating the Christian's freedom and selfhood is by bidding him look out upon the world and bend his mind to the discovery of what action is demanded by each problem as it presents itself; and there is joy in heaven over every man who honestly accepts the responsibility for his acts.

But there is danger also of a self-assertiveness which is not self-creation according to God's will. It seems probable that in the normal development of the spiritual life there are a succession of stages through which freedom and selfhood grow. It is only the surrendered and consecrated self which is free from fear of self-seeking. The renunciation of the world is a necessary preliminary to the regarding of the world as raw materials for the creation of the City of God. Doubtless the two notes of renunciation and appreciation continue throughout life in a valuable tension.* Yet surely it is a right and proper sign of maturing development in a middle-aged Christian if in looking back over his life he feels as though God had gently but firmly turned him round to face the world and find in it his interests. This is "the unitive way," but it must spring from roots in the purgative and illuminative. If I may venture to say so, some clergy seem to me to be trying to urge their congregations to adopt the unitive way without having approached it through the purgative and illuminative. In America this is called "preaching the social gospel." But others seem to be determined never to let their congregations get beyond the purgative; these are they who regard mankind as church-fodder, and identify the deepening of the spiritual life with the multiplication of devotional exercises.

It has now become clear that the foundation stone of the Christian idea of liberty is the conviction of God's reality and activity. There is all the difference in the world between the religion which begins by saying, "I believe in God," and that which says, "If I improve myself sufficiently God will believe in me." Conviction and trust may be slow in coming, but in proportion as they come there comes the experience of Christian freedom. In the inner life of the individual, and in the social relationships of mankind, it is the objective reference to the will of God which gives birth to liberty.

In the inner life this truth shines out on every side. Three illustrations of it may be useful. That the experience of freedom from sin depends on trust in an objective divine activity is the message of the Atonement; and no attempts to state that doctrine without such reference ever have been or can be satis-

* See *Essays in Christian Philosophy*, Essay VI.

factory.* Secondly, there is freedom in the control of our thoughts, well described by Father Underhill when he says: "To be able deliberately to choose one's thoughts; to decide which are to be entertained as healthy and invigorating, which are to be excluded as weakening or actually evil; and to hold to one's choice—this is liberty indeed! And this is the road to effective prayer, to adoration, to the ability to hear what God says to us. But it implies long discipline of the interior life."† Through God's activity, that is to say, the discipline of surrender to Him issues in a new liberty. Thirdly, there is freedom from fear. A man was once allowing himself to sink mentally into that foolish state wherein gloomy pessimism is accepted as though it were pious resignation. There were doubtless reasons for anxiety: sexual self-restraint, financial difficulties, and the burden of serious illness in his family combined to give real grounds for it. But there were no sane grounds for indulgence in the mock-heroics of imagining himself especially pleasing to God because he accepted forsooth the cross of a dismal situation. Suddenly one day, as he made his meditation, there leapt up at him out of the pages of his Bible the words: "God hath not given us the spirit of fear, but of power, and of love, and of a sound mind."‡ He realized that wherever his fears came from they were not from God, that he was dishonouring God by treating Him as though He delighted in the miseries of His servants, and that what he might confidently look for were power, love and a sound mind. With this realization came freedom from the fears which had obsessed him, and strength to meet the difficulties of the immediate situation.

This reference to the objective activity of God is the foundation not only of individual, but also of social freedom. The Christian idea of marriage, for instance, is inspired by the Christian idea of liberty.

A few years ago a man was deserted by his wife, to whom he was devoted. She left him for another, and obtained a divorce. Some years later, when he was apparently recovering from his loss, the rumour went about that he was going to marry again. A friend asked him directly whether this was so, and received the reply: "Twenty years ago I vowed to God to be faithful to my wife, and no matter what has happened since I regard myself as bound by that vow." Now at first sight this appears the very negation of liberty; but let us look a little closer.

My attention has recently been called to the following

* Cp. my *And was made Man*, pp. 86-95.

† *Prayer in Modern Life* (London: Mowbray, 1929), p. 40.

‡ 2 Tim. i. 7.

passage from Mr. Alec Waugh's description of the Polynesian islands: "Tahiti is love's land. Love there is freely given. There are no discussions with head boys, no bargaining with parents; there are no responsibilities. No girl will be reluctant to have children in a country where children are well loved, where life is easy and life is happy. For the believer in free love Tahiti will seem the realization of all his dreams. And I am not sure that Tahiti's lesson to the white man is not the discovery that there is no such thing as free love; that he neither loves nor is loved who has no bonds laid on him; that it is not the person who gives, but the person to whom you give who matters; that to the person to whom you have given something of yourself you are bound permanently, since you must return to that person if you would be complete; which is a thing that the person who has divided himself between many loves can never be."*

If there be any truth in this paradox that love in order to be free must be bound, the important question is what kind of binding makes for freedom. It has been the argument of this essay that empirical observation, metaphysical speculation, and inner spiritual experience unite to testify that surrender to God is the secret of liberty, and the Christian idea of marriage is that of a contract wherein the two parties are bound to one another, not merely by a mutual interchange of vows between themselves, but by a joint self-dedication to God. Marriage as a contract between husband, wife, and society existed and exists apart from the religious ideas which inspire Christian practice. The Christian theory is that by introducing the special reference to God the Church increases the opportunity for love to grow in true freedom. God being who and what He is, the joint service of Him (by those who realize what they are doing) will not be the galling servitude which obligations to one another or to the state may become. This theory can only be proved by experiment, and two thousand years is too short a time for its truth to have been conclusively demonstrated. Christian marriage is still a comparative novelty in human history, a way of life which we are in process of trying to establish among men and women; but we have, I believe, enough accumulated experience of those who have experimented with it to justify our conviction that it embodies the true solution of the problem of freedom in sex-relations.

In all human societies—families, schools, colleges, churches, states, and other communities—the practical problem of the right achievement of freedom is continually recurring in new

* *The Coloured Countries*, p. 134.

forms. There is a standing tension between the claims of the corporate freedom of the whole body and the claims of the private freedom of the individual member. The right solution of each particular problem as it arises can only be found empirically by inspection of the circumstances,* but according to the Christian idea of liberty there is a right principle on which the search is to be conducted. This is that objective reference to God of which we have been thinking. The community does not exist for the individual, nor the individual for the community, but both exist for the doing of God's will. It is our faith that in the time-process God is engaged in eliciting created freedom from the material universe, and that if both society and individual set their minds to discover and do the will of God, their apparently conflicting claims will ultimately be reconciled in harmony.

To prescribe devotion to the fulfilment of God's will is useless so long as that phrase remains a high-sounding form of words, emotionally attractive, but devoid of any thought-out understanding of its content. We must think of God as revealing His will to us in many ways: through the discoveries of scientists, the reflections of philosophers, and the insight of artists, as well as in the personal communion of the life of prayer.† Let us suppose, for example, that there is a question of improving the means of transportation by building a new bridge across the river in the heart of a great city. It is surely the will of God that the bridge shall be as beautiful as architectural vision can make it, as secure as engineering skill can establish it, as consonant with the best development of its neighbourhood as competent town-planning can secure, and its cost as equitable a balance between the claims of those who work upon it and those who have to pay for it as skilled economists can strike. Like Adam and Eve in the Garden, we are here on earth "to dress it and to keep it," and the will of God is revealed to us, so to speak, through His servants the botanists and landscape-gardeners.

But times come when there is a definite clash of opinions over what is the right thing to be done, as when parents and children differ over some proposed course of action, or when conscientious objectors disagree with the Government of their country in time of war. Moreover, circumstances may necessitate the taking of action before it has been possible to harmonize the divergent points of view; so that in the clash of opinions the decision has to be reached by the application of force.‡

* *Cp. Essays in Christian Philosophy*, p. 73.

† *Cp. Essays in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 121-124.

‡ Note that in this connection decision by a majority vote, or by fiat of authority, is application of force no less than bodily restraint.

This world, we have seen, is in process of creation, and the aim of the whole process is the eliciting of created freedom. At our present stage of development we have often to be content for the moment with an imperfect degree of freedom, neither undervaluing what has already been achieved nor denying its imperfection. Where neither parents on the one hand nor children on the other, where neither state nor individual citizen are wholly conformed to the doing of God's will, perfect freedom cannot be enjoyed by any of them. Under these circumstances two things are to be done. Each party must examine his conscience and try to ensure that he is honestly seeking to do the will of God, and must also honestly credit the other party with doing the same. Where the urgency of time demands decision by force there is no necessary dishonour, either in the application of the force or in suffering from its application. If we have honestly aimed at securing the utmost liberty attainable at the moment, out of the travail will be born a future in which freedom will be more fully attainable. The one necessity is that throughout the dispute every man should regard it as a joint search for an objective principle of action in which no one party has, so to speak, a "corner" in moral integrity or insight. There may have to be the application of force, and submission to it; there need be no rancour or bitterness or accusations of unworthy motives.

Conflicts of this kind arise within the Church, where it is sometimes difficult to reconcile the claims of the Church as a whole with the individual member's private right of judgment in matters of faith or liberty of conscience in matters of conduct. Here as elsewhere the conflict springs from the fact that we are in process of apprehending God's revelation of His truth and of His will for us. At any moment one or other of the two parties may be more advanced than the other in deepening insight, or each may have laid hold on some element in the revelation while it is as yet difficult to see how the two can be reconciled. Once again there must be honesty and good-will on both sides, and the objective reference to God, an act of faith that there is ultimately a solution in which whatever is true in either position is established in harmony with the rest. Sometimes the individual may be right in withdrawing from the communion of the Church; sometimes the Church may be right in insisting on his doing so; sometimes this may be unnecessary; and sometimes it may be positively the wrong solution. The conflicts that arise can rightly be solved only by actual inspection of the circumstances of each case. The important point to be remembered is that where it is necessary to curtail the liberty either of the Church as a whole or of the individual member, this

is not necessarily due either to the tyranny of the one or the pertinacious obstinacy of the other. The necessity may arise from the fact that the dispute broke out at an imperfect stage in the creative development of this world, a stage wherein the conditions of an ideal solution are not yet present. All parties share alike in this disability, and if all recognize that therein lies the seat of the difficulty, it should be possible for the strife to be free from rancour and bitterness, to be that creative strife out of which is born a future in which freedom can be more richly enjoyed.

The Christian theoretical solution of this tension between the claims of society and of the individual is well presented by Father Thornton in *The Incarnate Lord*. In Christ both individual and society find their perfect selves, those selves towards which by God's grace they are now growing through the right use of the time-process. Only in the perfection of the process will the tension find its complete resolution and full freedom be enjoyed. Meanwhile the truth of this christological contribution to metaphysics has to be experimentally verified by the Christian Church. Deeds must come before words; we must pursue and find freedom by exploring what it means to be adopted into Christ's sonship and walking through life seeking with Him to find and do the Father's will in the guidance and power of the Spirit. Freedom comes in proportion as a man can learn to live by the principle, "It does not matter what happens to me, so long as the will of God be done." The Christian Church offers to mankind the opportunity to grow in the life of self-surrender and thus to find liberty.

The inner side of freedom is discipline. The artist is free to express himself in so far as he has accepted the discipline of acquiring his technique; the scholar is free to advance human knowledge only when he has disciplined himself to master the canons of his science. Technique and canons of study are particular manifestations of God's way of ordering the universe; their necessity for freedom in these specific spheres illustrates the general rule that freedom depends on conformity to God's will. For God alone is truly free, and freedom is His gift to those who come to share His life. In the words of the Psalmist: "I will walk at liberty, for I seek Thy commandments."

LEONARD HODGSON.

THE ATTITUDE AND CHALLENGE OF THE WORLD TO THE CHURCH TODAY*

"THE Attitude and Challenge of the World to the Church Today." I realize only too well that the subject is too large for the time at my disposal and far too large for my knowledge. I can only speak of the attitude of certain small sections of the world that have come under my notice. I am slightly encouraged by the second paragraph of the announcement of this year's conference, which asks us to share our own experiences and solutions and doubts, for I can only offer a very tentative, fragmentary, inadequate, and personal paper. But though I know myself unfit to deal with the attitude of the world to the Church, I do keenly feel that the problem which it presents is a grave one. Grave for the Church and even graver for the world. I believe the Church to have been supernaturally founded, and that it draws its strength from that world whose quality, unlike that of our world, is permanence. I cannot, therefore, think that an institution so founded and so sustained can be overcome by present dangers, full of menace though they be, any more than it could have been overwhelmed by the terrific storms which it has weathered in the past. But it can be well believed and, alas! seen how many people, from ignorance and from a misuse of their God-given gift of free-will, can ignore or turn from the Church, and, more serious, all that she stands for, to their own grievous loss.

People are today beset by philosophies, systems of psychology, and works of art that deny and war against the Church's fundamental doctrines of belief in man's free-will, man's reason, and man's soul. They endeavour to reduce him to reactions, reflexes, and appetites, or to the level of what we used to call inorganic matter. These enemies have always existed, in one form or another, though in our day they are greatly strengthened by the new half-science of psychology and the exaltation of the physical sciences, but never before have there been so many people with education enough to grasp these dangerous delusions and with so little real wisdom, habits of discipline, or reliance on authority with which to combat them. Never before, perhaps, have there been so many temptations to lead a life of constant distraction and pleasure, never has it been so difficult to find time for (or even to realize that there *are* such things as) prayer and meditation. And without these how can we acquire that sense of proportion which is the secret of a wise life as it is the

* A paper read at the Anglican Fellowship Conference, July, 1931.

secret of good art? Never have there been so many unproved hypotheses and half-baked ideas at large in the world or so many people, people unsuited by nature and temperament to the use of ideas at all, ready to seize upon them and try to live by them or, more likely, use them as excuses for following that line of least resistance, the road that descends into Avernus.

I believe Mr. Chesterton to have been right when he puts into the mouth of Dr. Johnson in his play *The Judgment of Dr Johnson* the statement that Mary Swift "is of a sort that always has been and always will be the nucleus and norm of humanity; which understands its duties before it has defined them." Dr. Johnson then goes on: "How large a proportion of our fellow-creatures live and die and do good work without being troubled even with good opinions and ideas; the more reason, Sir, that they should have good customs and a sound religion."

But in these days of mistaken reliance on a clerical education for everyone, when ordinary, practical people have been to so great an extent deprived of their skilled trades and crafts, and been given in exchange for that bread the stone of the repetition, in a factory, of a few mechanical actions, now that *opus* has, for so many, been changed to *labor*, those people, suited to good work and few ideas, to reliance on customs and religion, are deprived of their work, their customs, and their religion, and given in exchange ideas, theories, and "facts" of science—things only to be safely handled by those with a natural aptitude and a long training.

The challenge to the Church. But is the Church so much challenged as neglected? As I read that word "challenge" I found myself wishing that there were more challenges to the Church in the world today. For a challenge can bring out heroic qualities in both challenged and challenger—the Church has been strengthened and brought to penitence and reform ere now by challengers both within her fold, like Catherine or Teresa, or without it, like Shelley. For where the ideals of the rebel are nobler than those of the orthodox, the orthodox is in time compelled to remould his and bring them nearer to those of the Founder of his faith.

The attacks of the intelligentsia are less alarming than the ignorance and indifference of the average man and woman. As Father Mackay says, "The most dangerous enemies the Gospel of Christ has to contend with are not the many who deny it, nor the few who betray it, but the multitude who trifle with it."

It may be my own ignorance; but I am not so much troubled by the danger to the Church of the attacks of learned

men as I am by the pathos of the position of those who have fallen away from or never known the Church, and yet who stand in such sore need of her support. It may be, as Stevenson says, that "pity is my cue." Yet to feel pity is to be challenged, challenged to help those whom we pity. Perhaps I cannot do better than try to give a few of the reasons why I pity so many modern people, especially young people, and how their plight challenges the Church to serve and save them. We know the remedy for their ills—Jesus Christ and Him crucified—but I hope that in the discussion and in the papers to follow those wiser than I will be able to suggest how the remedy may be made acceptable by us to the modern world, how these challenges to our pity and our aid may be taken up. For it is we of the Churches, clerics and laymen alike, who stand between the world and the Figure on the cross, and it would be well for us if we were "less opaque." If we could only give ourselves completely enough to God we could be transparent, the media through which Christ could manifest Himself to men.

Perhaps the most general and widespread challenge to our pity is that so large a part of the modern world is trying "to lead a pagan life in uncomfortable proximity to Christianity." They live in a world founded and built up for nearly two thousand years on the Christian ethic; it has made them appallingly more sensitive, for themselves and for others, to pain, sickness, sorrow, and death than are the primitive races or the Chinese and Japanese. They suffer from the disadvantages of Christianity, and have none of its supernatural consolations; they are followers, again to quote Father Mackay, of the religion of Simon of Cyrene; the cross is thrust upon them by the whole form of European life; they bear it unwillingly and yet cannot escape it; it is like the albatross about the Ancient Mariner's neck. Christ's yoke is easy and His burden light if we take it of our own free-wills, for then He helps us to bear it, but it is cruelly heavy, with its weight of helpless, hopeless pity, if we have no supernatural aid in carrying it.

Though this challenge from the followers of Simon the Cyrenean appeals first to our pity, it may well also arouse our fears. If our European civilization, with its care for and preservation of the unfit and helpless, were to lose the driving force of its belief in the supernatural sanctions at the back of its ethic, how would its sensitive people, uninspired, stand against races unweakened by sensitiveness and pity?

The next general challenge to our pity is the strange new admixture of knowledge and ignorance in the modern world. This ignorance of the simplest doctrines of Christian theology has been increasing ever since the physical sciences usurped the

throne of theology, till then the queen of the sciences. The ordinary man is not less credulous than he used to be; he is simply credulous about the untried things and sceptical of the tried ones. He believes what he is told about the laws of the physical sciences and doubts what his ancestors believed to be the laws of the moral science; he reverses the Platonic beliefs and calls changeable the ideas of goodness, truth, and beauty, which Plato called permanent, and believes to be permanent the "facts" of science, which Plato called what we might translate as a "good guess."

In the days when church-going was the general rule the most ignorant peasant knew something of its theology and doctrine. Now that, for so many people, the Church is only a convenient and conventional place to celebrate christenings, marriages, and funerals it is possible to find intelligent people so ignorant that they will believe the grossest slanders against the Church as readily as their ancestors believed travellers' tales of men with heads between their shoulders. Mr. Bertrand Russell can be believed when he states, though it is hard to believe that Mr. Russell can himself make these statements in ignorance, that the Catholic Church compels an inexperienced girl, married in ignorance, to continue to live with and bear children to a syphilitic husband.

I am often reminded of this little dialogue between a Roman Catholic and a man who said he was an agnostic. "Have you read," asked the Catholic, "Newman's *Apologia*?" "No," replied the agnostic. "Then you err," retorted the Catholic; "you are not an agnostic, you are an ignoramus!" But this bland ignorance, annoying though it may be, is a true challenge to our pity and to our desire to enlighten it. For it means that our young people are cut off from the past of their race in Europe, which was lived in the Christian tradition. It means that they have no true education, if we accept Mr. T. S. Eliot's definition that the object of true education "is to develop a wise and large capacity for orthodoxy, to preserve the individual from the solely centrifugal impulse of heresy, to make him capable of judging for himself, and at the same time capable of judging and understanding the judgments of the experience of the race."

The tendency now is to bring young people up to concentrate on self-expression and not on Christian humility, yet humility is the great teacher of perspective—it shows us ourselves in relation to our fellow-men and to God. There is at present a strange belief that self-discipline, unlike any other art, will come without practice, and come more easily, differing in this from any other kind of knowledge, if learned in later life and not in childhood. Young people, freed from discipline and humility,

may find themselves possessed of no freedom but the freedom of that dreary prison, the prison of themselves. If they then long, as most men do long, for authority, they must make it for themselves. They must make some crazy theory to deal with and explain the facts of their own lives, instead of learning, by the help of Christianity, to master or endure them.

How disastrous this too great freedom from authority, this lack of humility can be has been tragically illustrated in our own day in the life and work of D. H. Lawrence, a great artist whose talent has been wasted and whose influence has been used for evil. A man of a great poetic and non-intellectual genius, his longing for authority and his uncorrected spiritual pride diverted him from his natural rôle of artist to the unsuitable one of prophet and law-giver; he tried, as all such prophets must, to erect into laws his personal experiences and impressions, but not his impressions guided and controlled by the experience of mankind, but his impulses, his reactions, and his repulsions. He was encouraged in this by friends, chief among them Mr. Middleton Murry, who were equally contemptuous of Christian authority and equally hungry for some substitute. As Lawrence's reactions and repulsions were to a great extent the result of his own unhappy past and physical disabilities, they made a poor foundation for a philosophy, or rather for a series of philosophies, and they are, to my thinking, a deplorable food for the already naturally egoistic, proud, and inexperienced spirit of youth. For Lawrence's gospels dealt mostly with religion and sex, and few theories are so fraught with danger and a glamorous attractiveness as those connecting sex and religion. For, if sex be lowered, religion may be lost; if religion is lost, sex is bound to be lowered. Lawrence's teaching was all in opposition to what seems to me the only hope of a solution of our sexual difficulties, that love should become less and less dependent on, less and less governed by, though still using and transfiguring sex, should become more and more the child of the spiritual imagination. Lawrence was continually exacerbated by the imperfections of human relationships, but could never realize that the love of two human beings is only made perfect in the love of God. The paths Lawrence pointed out lead us back to the life of the animals, almost to the primeval slime, away from all that man has so painfully gained through the centuries. And, though the animals may achieve their best by following the laws of their own natures, man reaches his best in his efforts to overreach himself, to achieve a supernature of which only the beginning is known to him, but of which, if he continues, more and more may be revealed, as is proved by the lives of the mystics and of the saints. I cannot believe that men

will for long follow these backward paths toward the animal when the forward path promises to lead us onward to the almost unbelievable Dominical promise and command that we are to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect.

Mr. Middleton Murry has just published what must be one of the strangest biographies ever written of his friend D. H. Lawrence, in which he shows that whenever Lawrence was faced with one of the choices with which our Lord was faced he always made the opposite decision to that of Jesus, and that he was always wrong and our Lord right, and that, in the end, Lawrence was left a broken man, a prophet without a message.

I want to consider a little further here the way in which much modern fiction challenges the Church and challenges our pity for those who are influenced by it. It may be that I give an undue weight to the importance of fiction in modern life because I am a little less ignorant of it than of more weighty subjects, yet I think it cannot be denied that it now has an influence that it never had before our times. The Bible and *The Pilgrim's Progress* are no longer the sole and wholesome literary food of our villages; in many cottages the only reading is the shoddy fiction of *The News of the World* and *The People*, while among the youthful intelligentsia fiction is the art most practised, discussed, and admired, and its influence is enormous. I would like to speak of the work of two men who are considered leaders of the modern movement in fiction, James Joyce and Aldous Huxley.

I hope I may be forgiven if I speak a little of books that many people will rightly think are better unread; but if our sons and daughters, our nephews and nieces, are reading them, it may be well to consider their effect and how we may combat it if it is evil.

I was rather surprised to find the other day, in an article full of sense on the difficult subject of pornography, the statement that James Joyce's *Ulysses* "may reasonably be held disgusting in parts, but it is utterly harmless. It could not conceivably 'debauch' either the young or the old." In the ordinary sense in which the word "debauch" is used this is probably true. It is almost inconceivable that acquaintance with the mind of Mrs. Blom or with Mr. Joyce's version of *Walpurgis Nacht* would encourage any man, young or old, to seek evil society; yet, in a subtler and far more serious sense, many modern books, and pre-eminently *Ulysses*, have a tendency to "debauch" the young. The Oxford Pocket Dictionary gives, as its first definition of debauch, "pervert from virtue." *Ulysses* may not pervert from the virtue of chastity, though one cannot be sure of this, but it may easily pervert from that virtue which is the

parent of all virtues—courage, that type of moral courage which makes it possible for young men and women to realize and face the suffering, ugliness, and horror of the world and still feel that life is worth living, that it contains things and experiences which are worth fighting for, worth trying to find again after many failures and in spite of much disappointment. The spiritual atmosphere of books like *Ulysses* tempts young people to the ultimate treachery of hating, not only the hateful things in life, but life itself. (Perhaps I only imagine it, but I have seemed to see in the faces of some young friends a blighted look after reading *Ulysses*—as if life were less lovely to them than it had been before.) For in *Ulysses* what permanent distinction is there between life and the hate and hideousness which parody it or defile it? So is paralyzed the desire to live, to love, to enjoy, because life and love and enjoyment are made to seem as distasteful as are life's ugliest and most sordid things. *Ulysses* and its imitators may give this distaste, momentarily at least, to most of their readers; but older people have usually a more hopeful philosophy of life, or at least more helpful habits of thought or more beautiful memories to fall back on to restore their mental balance and their faith in life. But to show young people, whose opinions and beliefs about life are not yet formed, only the many hells that are undoubtedly on this earth and in men's souls without also showing them the broken and yet authentic reflections of the kingdom of heaven that are in men's hearts is not an "utterly harmless" thing. Young people may not realize the value of life when the scales have been too unfairly weighted down on the side of ugliness and evil.

I am reminded of a scene in a book widely read more than thirty years ago, *Ships that Pass in the Night*. The opening scene is, if I remember rightly, in the dining-room of a sanatorium for tuberculous patients in Switzerland. The heroine, recently arrived, is asked how long she expects to remain, and replies that she hopes soon to be back again at work in London. Another patient, known as the Disagreeable Man, replies: "You won't get better; I know your type well; you burn yourselves out quickly. And—my God—how I envy you!" The heroine turns on him and says: "Listen! Because you are hopeless it does not follow that you should try to make others hopeless too. You have drunk deep of the cup of poison; I can see that. To hand the cup on to others is the part of a coward." The language of the attack sounds a little high-falutin to our more modern ears, but it is a fair description of what many authors are doing today. They are passing on their own hopelessness about life to others. When the author is a man of great genius, as is Mr. Joyce, there is no denying the potency

of his poison. This poison lies not so much in his unexpressed philosophy as in the peculiar vividness of his distaste for the physical details of illness and vice and the dreadful dissolution of the body that is called dying. He has a sort of mental equivalent of the physical disease of hæmophilia, a complaint which deprives the blood of fibrin, so that it will not form a clot and allow a wound to heal; the victim of this disease may bleed to death from a cut finger or an extracted tooth. Mr. Joyce is an intellectual "bleeder." The shocks which the ugliness and horror of life gave him, the sights which he saw as a medical student, seem never to lose their force in his memory. Young nurses and medical students do indeed see a disproportionate number of physical and mental horrors, but all sensitive people suffer from these shocks in youth to a greater or less degree. With most of us a sense of proportion acts, in our later mental life, as does fibrin in the blood, and enables our wounds to heal. The more fortunate among us come to believe that the pain and horror of life are part of a temporal order, its beauty and happiness of an eternal one. The strange vividness that Mr. Joyce's genius gives to his memories of disgusting and painful scenes makes them dangerous building material for minds still erecting the fabric of a philosophy of life.

It is true that *Ulysses* cannot be bought in England or the United States, but smuggled copies go the rounds, in the large cities at least, of people interested in literature, particularly at the universities. And Mr. Aldous Huxley's *Point Counter Point*, a work of less genius, but more easily read and of a more obvious brilliance, has had a popular success. It too has the modern disease of dislike of life and living people. Like much modern fiction, it has interest in, enjoyment of, and sympathy with the sins it describes, and is full of distaste for, of dislike and disgust of, the sinners.

This reversal of the old advice to hate the sin and love the sinner is particularly noticeable in *Point Counter Point*, because Mr. Huxley has consciously modelled one of his chief characters on the hero of Dostoevsky's novel, *The Possessed*. Spandrell's viciousness is weak and shadowy compared with Stavrogin's, nor do the unpleasant descriptions of Sir John Bidlake's greed and sensuality compare with those of Karamazov père. Even Lady Lucy Tantamount's accounts of her amusements in Paris give one but a small shudder of disgust when compared with the genuine horror we feel at the story of old Karamazov and the idiot girl. Yet the worst horrors of Dostoevsky's novels purge us by their pity and terror; we end by saying, "There, but for the grace of God, go I!" For Dostoevsky loved, which does

not mean liked, his sinners. Unless we happen to regard all the characters in *Point Counter Point* as unreal, because they are but different aspects of their author's consciousness, we turn from most of them with a sick distaste which might spread, did it not encounter a belief in other aspects of life and of our fellow-men, to a dislike of life itself. As Mr. Desmond MacCarthy says, in a penetrating analysis of Mr. Huxley's talent: "We find ourselves perpetually looking down on human nature; we never have the exhilaration of looking up. To share his detachment is for a while flattering; for though we may often recognize our own failings and ignoble predicaments in his pages, these facts exist in our own lives, we know, in contexts which are omitted from his books, and which relieve them of much of their meanness. It is primarily, therefore, other people who appear to us to be mercilessly exposed. This is agreeable until we realize that, after all, it is as necessary to respect and like at least a few other people as it is to respect ourselves."

It is probable that this mood of dislike of life and of humanity is the natural reaction, increased by post-war depression, from the too high hopes of the inherent perfection of mankind held by the American and French revolutionaries, hopes that found their most flamboyant and confident and beautiful expression in the works of Walt Whitman. It is hard lines on the young people who read little philosophy and history, less theology and much fiction, that they may accept the mood of this reaction, as expressed in fiction, for their philosophy of life. One had better say, perhaps, their philosophy of death. Our hope for them must lie, not in any police interference or protection, but in that inevitable swing of the pendulum which will allow us to return to a saner and more hopeful mood, and that in the meantime they may be shown, or, better, find for themselves, that other philosophy, of which many of them know so little, in which the eighteenth-century hope and the twentieth-century disillusion are reconciled—the philosophy that regards all men as sinners to be pitied, yet as sinners who, bearing a defaced image of the divine, may also be revered; which believes that life is never quite hopeless, even for the thief on the cross, and that there are no failures which cannot become the turning points to success. But in the meantime I am sometimes reminded of Kipling's tragic line: "God help us, for we knew the worst too young." I hope that I am exaggerating. I realize that to know of evil things is not the same thing as to experience them, yet it means a stupidity and may mean a coarsening that such a word as "sadist" should have become almost a slang synonym for cruel.

One last challenge. There can be no doubt, I think, that most modern thought has been influenced by systems of psychology of the more or less Freudian type. There seem to me to be three grave dangers here: first, they rest on the often workable, but still more or less unproved, hypothesis of the unconscious and its importance in life; secondly, they confuse what must always be an art with a science; and, thirdly, they believe or have believed (for there has been some rude disillusioning) that a diagnosis is synonymous with a cure. Of this last danger a case has lately come under my own notice. A young married man had a nervous breakdown. He was taken to a well-known practitioner of psycho-analysis. For three years he was encouraged to talk about himself, for three years his devoted wife bore with him and supported him and earned the money to pay the analyst some nine guineas a week. In the end her reward was that the analyst told the young man, not that he might well thank Heaven fasting for a good wife's faithful love and care, but that he had married a dark woman, like his mother, and should have married her opposite, a blonde. He went on to say that he had now removed every complex and repression (even prenatal ones), and that the only reason the young man was still no better was because he lacked will-power. A thing that any priest, almost any person of common sense, could have told him in the beginning.

But how is will-power to be developed if to say "No" to our impulses will cause a complex or a repression? (It is true that the wiser psycho-analysts are retreating from this position, and the last lecture I read of Dr. Jung's might have been any wise doctor's or schoolmaster's advice to young people on marriage.) But these errors usually have a popular life long after their creators have abandoned or partially abandoned them. This modern objection to the word "No"—to asceticism, in other words—may well be one of the causes of the slackness of which we all rightly complain. William James, in speaking of how most of us live and work on strata of energy much lower than is within our powers, says: "One single successful effort of moral volition, such as saying 'No' to some habitual temptation, or performing some courageous act, will launch a man on to a higher level of energy for days or weeks or give him a new range of power."

I feel that these fragmentary glimpses of the challengers of the Church may make a gloomy picture, more depressing, perhaps, because of the indifference, confusion, and weakness of the challenge. But in man's dual nature is the remedy and our hope, in his soul which longs, no matter how he stifles and disbelieves in it, for the life outside time, the life of eternity.

I think none of us who are old enough to remember the Great War need ever be discouraged if we remember the eagerness with which so many men, in spite of the mixed motives of so many others, seized on the opportunity for self-sacrifice, learned what our Lord meant by "He that loseth his life shall find it."

I will end with the words of a friend and not a challenger of the Church, Mr. G. K. Chesterton. In his "Ballad of the White Horse" he pictures King Alfred, in despair and desolation on Athelney Island—where, centuries later, his jewel was picked up and taken to our Ashmolean—and to Alfred appears a vision of Mary, from whom he seeks comfort and cause for courage. And Our Lady gives him a strange word of encouragement, which Alfred then carries as he goes to summon the last lines of the British and English Christians against the heathen Danes. It is a word that can well resound in our own ears, and teach us to embolden our hearts:

"I give you naught for your comfort—
Nay, naught for your desire—
Save that the sky grows darker yet
And the sea rises higher."

HARRIET KEEN ROBERTS.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

UNDER the title of "The Cobbler Forsakes his Last," we find ourselves taken somewhat severely to task in the July number of *The Commonwealth* for some editorial remarks which we made on Socialism in THEOLOGY for that month. We will only say that the events of the last few weeks seem to us to have justified up to the hilt everything that we then wrote; and, indeed, our opinions would appear to have coincided closely with those of Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Snowden, and Mr. Thomas. As to "forsaking our last," we should be sorry if *The Commonwealth* is to take the line that a priest may not express opinions on political and social subjects. Or are they only permissible when uttered in support of one side?

There is common agreement that the balancing of the Budget is only a preliminary to the more serious problem of the balance of trade; and, if so, we may see a really vigorous effort made in Parliament to deal with the causes of unemployment. If anyone wants to realize what unemployment is meaning, he will find it poignantly brought home in the July-August number of *The Flowerette*, the organ of the Home of St. Francis in Dorset. Nothing could make it more clear that the real need of the unemployed is not unemployment benefit, but work; and the main problem to which public opinion must now insist on Parliament addressing itself is that of restoring confidence to the leaders of industry, and so setting its wheels once more in motion.

We have received, and are glad to welcome, *The Story of Christendom*, Part I., by Mrs. Duncan-Jones (S.P.C.K. and St. Christopher Press, 2s. net). Those who know Mrs. Duncan-Jones's gift for telling an historical tale will expect that this record of "The Making of Christendom," which carries the story down to the Great Schism, will be good reading; and they will not be disappointed. The volume is the first instalment of a book which Mrs. Duncan-Jones was asked to write by the Committee which recently prepared the new *Portsmouth Syllabus of Religious Instruction* (Diocesan House, Portsmouth, or S.P.C.K., or National Society, 2s. net); and we are sure that teachers, both in school and Sunday school, as well as clergy and senior children themselves, will find it just the book they want.

The S.P.C.K. are to be congratulated on the publication of their *Churchman's Engagement Book*, 1932, which, besides following the new Lectionary and Calendar, gives also the appropriate liturgical colours for each day and season. The little book represents a new and much improved article.

NOTES

I.—A COPTIC BAPTISM

[The recent and much lamented death of the late Prebendary R. M. Woolley—a figure beloved by all who remember his contributions to the discussions of the revised Prayer Book in Convocation and the Church

Assembly—lends a peculiar interest to the following recollections of a Coptic Baptism which comes from the pen of Miss Constance Padwick. —ED.]

Go to the ruined fortress of Babylon in Old Cairo—that fortress built (men say) by “Nebuchadnezzar” and named after his far-off capital, and more surely rebuilt by Trajan with walls that still partly stand; that “Babylon” whose “Soldans” met St. Louis and the other mediæval champions of Christendom. Under the Coptic Church of Abu Serga within the fortress wall enter the tiny and more ancient Crypt Church of Our Lady, stooping as you pass down the low-roofed stairway. In that dark and tiny sanctuary (some twenty feet by fifteen) on some Sunday morning you will find a huddle of humanity, with heat, candles, and much wailing of babes. For it is here that the mothers of Old Cairo best love to bring their children to Baptism. This tiny Crypt hugs to its heart a precious tradition that here was the resting-place of the Holy Babe who learnt to walk on the dusty soil of Egypt. Here, then, the mothers come to the crude Jordan (font), black with candle smoke and baptismal oils, cut in the south-east wall. And the service said over Coptic babes today enshrines as great a weight of ancient, indubitably ancient, hallowed and beloved tradition as the dear little sanctuary where it is performed.

The reading of this ancient Baptismal Service is now for the first time made easy for the ordinary non-scholastic reader by the translation of the *Coptic Offices*,* published by Dr. R. M. Woolley. This book includes the offices for Baptism, Matrimony, the Anointing of the Sick, and the Burial of the Dead. All are of very great interest, but in one brief review we shall dwell only on the first. We choose it not only as the most important, but as the most individual. The Coptic Church has remained more distinct from the greater Orthodox Churches in her Baptismal Services than in any others. With the Ethiopic and Nestorian Churches, she alone of all Churches in the world has preserved a type of Baptismal Office moulded on the same pattern as her Liturgy; thus setting these two sacraments together, and apart from all the other worship of the Church.

The Coptic Baptismal Office has the stately, leisurely structure of the Divine Liturgy, and contains many of the pro-anaphoral prayers and even many words of the anaphora.

Where Dr. Woolley has had occasion to translate prayers found in the Divine Liturgy and previously translated by Dr. J. M. Neale, we notice variations which may be the result of a difference of opinion in the translators, or may arise from the fact that there is no standard, critically edited and scrutinized version of these services in Coptic or in Arabic. Dr. Woolley's translation is from an edition printed at Al-Watan Press, Cairo, in 1895, which opens the Baptismal Service with the Absolution of the Woman after Childbirth, and would seem not to contain that recitation of Psalm li. with which the service of making a Catechumen is said to have begun in ancient days.

His mother being “Churched,” the little Coptic babe passes in the course of one long service through the stages of entry upon the Catechumenate, Baptism, and Confirmation with the Anointing of Oil.

The first stage—that of the admission of a Catechumen—is of the deepest interest to the writer as a member of a missionary society in

* *Coptic Offices*, translated by Reginald Maxwell Woolley, D.D. S.P.C.K. 6s.

Egypt. The prayers now said over a sleeping babe half an hour before his Baptism are most evidently the prayers once said over men and women received, often perilously no doubt, from the surrounding heathenism into the seat of the learner. There is a stripping (of the old life), a turning to the west with renunciation, a turning to the east with profession, and an anointing with the oil of exorcism.

"All magic (prays the Church), all sorcery, all workings of Satan chase from them; all traces of idolatry and unbelief cast out of their heart."

The long and hard history of the Coptic Church has resulted in complete forgetfulness on the part of the average priest and congregation today of the original use of these prayers of the Catechuminate. But when the Anglican mission in Egypt was in need of prayers for the reception of Catechumens from Islam, the late Canon Gairdner found enshrined in this first section of the Coptic Baptism Service an office which (with the change of a few phrases to mark the difference between renunciation of a pagan faith and renunciation of Islam) is in use today at the reception of those who enter on the hard path that leads from Islam to Christ. It is our hope and prayer that the Coptic Church herself may again waken to the original meaning of these prayers, into which the word "infant" is but strangely introduced, and use them once more for the commendation to God of adults, Catechumens from her non-Christian countrymen.

The reception of Catechumens ended, the Baptismal Service continues, as we have said, with many a parallel to that of the Liturgy. Incense is directed to be offered, and as in the Coptic Liturgy of St. Basil, the lections that follow are taken from St. Paul, from the Catholic Epistles, from the Acts and from the Gospel. The troparion used as a gradual between Acts and Gospel is from Psalm xxxii. Thus, with much teaching of Scripture, the great deed is ushered in. The Great Intercession which follows in the old Coptic Baptism Service (usually curtailed today) is practically that which follows the Gospel in the Liturgy.

And now, where in the Liturgy the priest says secretly the Prayer of the Veil, in the Baptism Service he bends prostrate over the Jordan for his secret prayer of his own unworthiness, and his secret prayer is followed in both by the Three Great Prayers (the Peace, the Fathers, and the Congregations), leading up, after the hallowing of the Baptismal water with holy oil, to the salutation and the kiss of peace.

So we might continue to trace the close parallel march of the services through the high and central parts that follow, but enough has been said to suggest to readers of Dr. Woolley's translation a rich and interesting line to follow.

To us of the West, the crowning and girdling that follow the Baptism have something of strangeness and romance. Especially is this the case with that great historic welcoming cry of the Eastern Church, her *ἀξιος*, used here for the welcoming of the newly baptized—"Worthy, worthy, worthy is N. the Christian"—and never heard by the present writer without a thrill.

In conclusion, attention should be drawn to the Baptismal stichoi, chosen from the Psalms with so much of spiritual sympathy and poetic freedom. Members of the Coptic Church have told the writer of the peculiar spiritual joy and triumph that goes with the use of Psalm cl. at the very moment of Baptism.

CONSTANCE PADWICK.

II.—VOX SPONSÆ

THEOLOGY not very long ago, in a paper under the title of "Opus Dei," impressed the duty of reciting the Offices as a work God had imposed on priests and the religious. It may be well to view the matter from a different standpoint and consider the duty organized under the guidance of the Holy Spirit as the voice of the Faithful rendering divine praises in the form well pleasing to God, "Vox Sponsæ."

(a)

The Church must be regarded from two aspects. *It is the visible society.* For this there are many active and enthusiastic workers, and such work is popular at the present day. None question the need, and Christ has promised it due reward. There is a story of a facetious bishop addressing children and saying: "There is a book which I study regularly and try to understand. It is my constant companion and guide, and without it I could not do my work successfully. Its name begins with B. Can any of you tell me what book I am thinking of?" Eager and confident voices replied, "The Bible, sir." "No," said the bishop with a quiet smile, "Bradshaw." But this active life is full of danger unless consecrated by the contemplative, and becomes a passion to its victims ending in disaster. A young priest of great promise had "no time for his Offices, a course of sermons to prepare, a committee to organize, correspondence to get level with." In after years, when he was unfrocked for a grievous sin, folk wondered how so diligent a man could have so failed.

The other aspect is the *living continuation of Christ's earthly work*, what St. Paul terms the Mystical Body of Christ. In this is shown forth, not alone the active life, but also the life of prayer and praise. During our Lord's earthly life there was the continuous activity of good works, and after His Ascension the equally important life of never-ceasing intercession in heaven. By the Incarnation God associated humanity with His active work, and when He ended this on earth He left to His Church the charge of perpetuating, in His name and power, the continual praise due to His Father. Therefore the work of the Church is twofold—i.e., activity and zeal, but sanctified by prayer and praise. The loving and obedient Church delights, humbly, in the practice of both parts of her divine commission.

Christ, then, has left us a share of praise to fulfil, just as He has left us a share of active work, and a share of suffering to bear. Thus we receive "the fulness of Christ," so that in Christ and by Christ each Christian soul united to Him by Baptism may "bring forth the fruit of good works," and through Him and with Him and in Him should give all honour and glory to Him. Thus Christ is one with us and we one with Him. That is why His Church, His Mystical Body, must be associated here on earth with this active life of religion and also with the praise which the humanity of Christ now renders to the Father. The Church must, after the example of her Master, "offer the sacrifice of praise to God continually."

Consider how the Church, guided by the Holy Spirit, fulfils her mission. Of course, at the centre of her work she puts the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

This she surrounds with carefully selected readings, hymns and psalms and canticles, which serve as preparations and thanksgivings for the eucharistic offering. This constitutes "the Divine Office," the recitation of which she imposes on her clergy and religious—a *very grave obligation*. As to the elements of her praise, the Church composes some of them herself by the pens of her great saints and writers—*e.g.*, the hymns or the *Te Deum*; but chiefly she borrows from the books of sacred Scriptures inspired by God Himself. God alone knows how He should be praised. Even with petition, as St. Paul reminds us, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought," and need divine guidance, and this is more than ever the truth when with angels and archangels and all the company of heaven we make our feeble effort "to laud and magnify His glorious name."

To praise God in a worthy manner, it is needful that God Himself should compose the expressions of our praise. Therefore the Psalms form the chief part of the Offices. They relate, proclaim, and exalt all the wonderful perfections of God. On the lips of creatures, themselves incapable of comprehending the infinite, these praises are multiplied and continually repeated and without weariness ever set forth all the beauty, holiness, goodness, mercy, and magnificence of God. Writes St. Augustine: "Ut bene laudetur Deus, laudavit seipsum Deus; et ideo quia dignatus est laudare se, invenit homo quemadmodum laudet eum." Those who love God feel the need of praising Him and exalting His holy name continually.

At the same time the Psalms wonderfully express all the sentiments of the soul and all the needs of life. The Church knows well our need, and so, like a thoughtful mother, places on our lips all the deep aspirations of repentance, confidence, joy, and love. "Have mercy upon me after thy great goodness, for against thee only have I sinned." "Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for thou art with me." What confidence! At other times the Psalms express the deep thirst for God. "Like as the hart desireth the water brooks, so longeth my soul after thee, O God."

Again, and this is the highest motive for the Church's continual use of the Psalms, they *speaking to us of Christ*—His divinity and His humanity, many incidents of His earthly life and death. An old writer says, "Lex Christo gravida erat." The Church has gathered up this daily praise to her Divine Bridegroom and consecrated it in the name of the Holy Trinity by the *Gloria* at the end of every Psalm, and thus "the Holy Church throughout all the world doth acknowledge thee" in praise and love with the endless praise that the Word renders to His Father in heaven.

(β)

In thus assigning the chief place to praise and thanksgiving, the duty of prayer and intercession must not be overlooked. There is both prayer and intercession in heaven—for, indeed, does not the everlasting Priest ever live to make intercession? But even His continual intercession does not stop the eternal anthem. Thus, as it were, does praise clothe and envelop prayer and intercession. For praise is the glad outpouring of the soul at peace with God, brought by divine grace through the stages of penitence and grace. So there, in heaven, where no cloud intervenes between the creature and the Creator, there is praise such as

God loves well, the speech not of the aliens but of sons, not of time but of eternity, and which never wearies.

For us, poor pilgrims here, this is not yet. So the Church has divided her praises into a *liturgical cycle* full of instruction and useful for sanctification of daily life. From Advent to Pentecost she commemorates in broad outline the principal stages of the life of her Spouse, and during the rest of the year draws out the lessons thus imparted; and in the Feasts of her Saints gives examples of grace working on fruitful ground. From this vivid representation, renewed every year, we not only derive a knowledge of mysteries, but also it is, to attentive souls, an abundant source of help and strength.

The Evangelists, as a rule, give just the historic details, a simple attestation of the facts, and nothing more. The Church, in the Offices, raises a corner of the veil and lets us penetrate into the sentiments animating the Sacred Heart. Thus during Holy Week, guided by the Holy Spirit, she bids us recite such Psalms as "Thy rebuke hath broken my heart," "I am become, as it were, a monster to many," "Save me from the lion's mouth," "My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?"; so that we may share the feelings of Christ's Heart and learn to love Him more. It is the same with other mysteries. Each year the Church not only gives us a living representation of the life of her Bridegroom, but she invites us to penetrate, as far as a creature is able, into the soul of Christ, so that reading His inmost sentiments we may share them and be more closely united to our Divine Head.

(7)

These divine mysteries, which each year we are bid to celebrate, are *still living*. How differently the Passion Play at Oberammergau affects a devout Catholic and an unbeliever! To one it is an artistic display of great perfection, and to the other a real spiritual help. So the mysteries of Christ are not just objects of contemplation to the mind, but a participation in the different states of the Incarnate Word. The mysteries of Christ were first lived by Him that we might live them in our turn in union with Him. The life of Christ on earth was some thirty-three years; but the virtue of the mysteries is infinite and inexhaustible. When we celebrate them in the liturgical year we receive them according to the measure of our faith. They are then graces to us as if we had lived at the same time as our Lord's earthly life, and had been present at them. Christ is the author of them, but by His Incarnation He has associated all humanity with them and merited for His disciples all the graces He has willed to attach to them. The Church celebrates each one, since to her He has entrusted the work of continuing His mission on earth. Thus at Christmas His Nativity brings to us a new birth in Christ. During Lent and Passiontide He brings to us a death to sin, at Easter a life to righteousness. We are associated with His risen life at Ascension "that in heart and mind we may thither ascend," and in the power of the Holy Spirit descending at Whitsun "may evermore rejoice in His holy comfort." It is the same with all the other mysteries.

Christ has placed the celebration of these mysteries in the hands of His Bride, and we, guided by the Church, our Mother, must take our share in the worship rendered by Christ to His Father in heaven. The Church is adorned with the riches of the Divine Bridegroom. She has

the right to speak in His name. "Let me see thy countenance, let me hear thy voice, for sweet is thy voice and thy countenance is comely" (Song of Solomon ii. 14).

All this is such a sure way, such a real help in our daily life. We could not find one that would more directly lead us to Christ and make our life more one with His. The daily Office leads us by the hand straight to Him. First the Church contemplates the inmost mysteries of Christ's life, and then the examples of His Saints who lived by power of them, "A great multitude which no man could number of all nations and kindreds, and peoples and tongues." We "render the calves of our lips" to our God and He returns to us fourfold. We are called to share His triumph in *splendoribus sanctorum* and the glory of the Son in *sinu Patris*; while still on earth to associate ourselves, as far as possible, by faith and ardent love, with the praises of heaven.

H. M. WELLINGTON.

REVIEWS

ESSAYS IN ORDER

No. 1. RELIGION AND CULTURE. By Jacques Maritain. Translated by J. F. Scanlan.

No. 2. THE CRISIS IN THE WEST. By Peter Wust. Translated by E. I. Watkin.

No. 3. CHRISTIANITY AND THE NEW AGE. By Christopher Dawson. Sheed and Ward. 2s. 6d. per vol.

In a general introduction to the series by Mr. Dawson, it is said that "it is the aim of the present series to attempt to face the problems which arise from this new situation (*sc.* in the modern world), and to examine the possibilities of co-operation and of conflict that exist between the Catholic order and the new world. It will not confine itself to any single aspect of the question, but will deal with general principles and with the concrete problems of contemporary life."

The first book of the series is by M. Maritain, who is the most prominent member of the modern Thomist school of philosophy, and probably the greatest living Roman Catholic thinker. Many of his writings have been translated into English already; the subject of this little book (the most recent to be translated) is *Religion and Culture*. M. Maritain claims that the modern movement, known as humanism, misunderstands human nature, and, while apparently exalting it, really degrades it. The only true humanism is that which is elevated by belief in the Incarnation. The author traces the evils of modern civilization largely to the stark dualism of Descartes, with its unreconciled antithesis of pure spirit and geometrical extension. Cartesianism, he says, reduces man to "an angel driving a machine." Consequently, politics and economics have come to be regarded as essentially material in their ends, and the Aristotelian teaching of their subordination to ethics (which was the glory of mediæval times) has been forgotten. M. Maritain, however, realizes that it is idle to expect, or even to desire, to return to the ideal of the Middle Ages. What is required, he holds, is "a much less unitary ideal, in which an entirely moral and spiritual activity of the Church shall preside over the temporal order of a multitude of politically and culturally heterogeneous nations." For it is beyond the power of human reason by its unaided natural resources to procure the good of men and nations.

Nevertheless, the Church must beware of [being identified

with a specific form of culture or civilization. The Catholic religion alone is, however, "strictly transcendental, supra-cultural, supra-racial, and supra-national—because it is supernatural." But this twofold loyalty to the natural and the supernatural is painful. Catholic thought must be raised, like Christ on the Cross, between heaven and earth; it must be prepared to suffer.

Herr Wust's essay is entitled *The Crisis in the West*. His theme is essentially the same as M. Maritain's, but his treatment is historical rather than metaphysical. He seeks to show that the unrest and dissatisfaction of present times are due to the almost universal jettisoning of the supernatural. In this respect, he points out, there is a great gulf fixed between classical paganism and modern paganism. Both are doubtless man-centred, but in ancient paganism the picture is lightened by a glow of "natural piety" around what is sacred and the things of the spirit. According to Wust, the essential achievement of Catholic Christianity was that it transformed "the childlike cosmic realism" of the ancients into a supernatural realism hitherto unknown. Thus came to the human spirit a full awakening which enabled man to realize for the first time "the complete extent of his metaphysical structure."

The Renaissance, however, saw the beginning of the decline from this ideal. Three stages may be traced. First came the weakening of the supernatural conception of God in Deism; next, the short interlude of which Goethe's idealism is the typical representative; finally, a purely immanentist positivism and humanism held the field, as it still does today in many quarters.

Herr Wust sees no hope save in Roman Catholicism. He holds that all other types of Christianity have been eviscerated by modernism of the full belief in Christ. He does not, however, support these contentions by arguments or by evidence; nor does he attempt to deal with the vital question of the reconciliation of empirical scientific thought with the supernatural revelation of the Gospel. The only solution he has to offer (excellent and indispensable as it is) is hardly sufficient; it is that we should cultivate the interior life, since, as he truly says, *operari sequitur esse*.

Mr. Dawson's essay, *Christianity and the New Age*, surveys the modern situation in the light of the Catholic ideal of a religion transcendent and yet immanent in every department of human life. He examines some of the modern humanistic creeds, notably those of Mr. Middleton Murry and Professor

Babbit, and shows their halting inconsistency. Ultimately, he insists, "we must make our choice between the material organization of the world—based either on economic exploitation or on an economic absolutism which absorbs the whole of life and leaves no room for human values—and the Christian ideal of a spiritual order. . . . The choice . . . is not between an individualistic humanism and some form of collectivism, but between a collectivism that is purely mechanistic and one that is spiritual."

This book has an advantage over the other two in that it is not a translation. Consequently, it is the most readable of the three. The writer displays a wide knowledge of history and a keen insight into its significance. His book contains many forcible *obiter dicta*, as, for instance, when he says that "the Communists may have deified mechanism in theory, but it is the Americans who have realized it in practice." Although these three authors write as Roman Catholics, it is difficult to see that their contentions lend any support to Papal as distinct from non-Papal Catholicism.

LINDSAY DEWAR.

THE RIDDLE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, Bart., and Noel Davey. Faber and Faber. 10s. 6d. net.

"The riddle is a theological riddle, which is insoluble apart from the solution of an historical problem. What was the relation between Jesus of Nazareth and the Primitive Christian Church? That is the riddle." And round it Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and Mr. Davey have written what is in effect a most interesting and challenging Introduction to the New Testament. It differs from other Introductions in that questions of the date and authority of the documents are relegated to an appendix; but it belongs to the category, not only because the linguistic and textual problems of the New Testament are discussed, and discussed with great force and lucidity, but still more because the solution of the riddle underlay the writing, and therefore determines the interpretation, of the whole body of the literature. It was because the Christians knew who Jesus of Nazareth was that the New Testament is what it is.

When our authors say that there are "no assured results of New Testament criticism," they have in mind especially literary criticism; but their whole book is directed to showing that the critical method "discloses results, even assured results," in the theological and historical spheres, and that these results, if "very few," are also "very surprising and very inconvenient." Chief of these results is the demonstration that the humanitarian Jesus of Liberal Protestantism, of the Girton Conference of 1921,

and of Mr. Middleton Murry never existed. There never was a Jesus who was not the Christ, the Son of God: His life and teaching, death and resurrection, constituted a divine action, at once revealing and redeeming, which was *sui generis* in human history. Theologians have recognized more and more during the present century that this, which is the nucleus of the Catholic faith in the Incarnation, was also the faith not only of St. John, but also of St. Paul and the first generation of Christians; but an important school of criticism has always tended to assume that this faith, early as it was, was an accretion upon the original simplicity of Jesus and His teaching. That assumption our authors may be said to have shattered to pieces; and they have done so by showing that the words and deeds of the Lord, however "simple" they may appear on the surface, are shot through and through with Messianic significance. And the result is the establishment of a clear historical identity between the Jesus who preached in Galilee and the Jesus proclaimed by St. Paul.

Those who are acquainted with the developments of theology in recent times will realize the great significance of this book. It marks a real turning-point, and one not the less timely and important because it has been reached contemporaneously in Germany and Sweden. It involves a turning away from the speculations and surmises of literary criticism, which have been so characteristic of recent Modernist works (*cf.*, for instance, Canon Streeter's *The Primitive Church*), to the much more substantial task of historical criticism; and then an insistence that the full seriousness of the historical issue shall be faced. To many who have been accustomed to try and adapt the Gospel to modern thought by turning a blind or careless eye to the historical facts on which it rests the appearance of this book must be most disconcerting: it antiquates so much of what claimed to be up-to-date. Only so can we account for the tone—we might almost say the disingenuous tone—of the review of it which appeared in *The Times Literary Supplement* of Thursday, July 16. The book is at once too radical and too conservative for this reviewer—too radical because it asserts that "a biography of Jesus cannot be written," too conservative because it leaves the reader to conjecture that the best interpretation of the historical Jesus is still the *incarnatus est* of the Creed. Yet even that can hardly be held to excuse the reviewer for writing in the first paragraph of his review that "the real importance of the book before us lies, not in its answer to the riddle which it propounds, but in the religious experience of which it is the signal." That is the kind of accusation—for it is, of course, an accusation—that a reviewer only brings when he is

afraid of a book, but can give no reasons to rebut it. A somewhat similar charge was brought a few years ago in *The Times Literary Supplement* against a book of Mr. T. S. Eliot's; and we were interested to observe that only this year an *amende honorable* was made. We shall look with interest for a like apology in the present case.

In saying this we must not be thought to claim for *The Riddle of the New Testament* any exemption from criticism. So challenging a book is likely to have the defects of its qualities; and we have found ourselves reacting from time to time from its abruptness. Partly this is due to a use of capital letters, which gives the same sort of impression of overstatement as we get from the underlinings in the *Letters of Queen Victoria*; and partly it is due to the rigorous concentration of our authors upon the historical element in their theme. Seeing that they say that "the riddle is a theological riddle," we wonder whether they could not expand their concluding chapter so as to indicate with greater fulness the philosophical and theological implications of their solution. Again, though we agree entirely with their insistence on the frequent presence in the Gospels of veiled allusions to the Old Testament, we do not think that our authors have discriminated sufficiently between deliberate allusions and those that are due to literary reminiscence.

But, when all detailed criticisms have been made, the book remains an outstanding contribution to the understanding of the New Testament. Its terse and lucid style enables an immense amount of matter to be packed into a small space; and nothing irrelevant is included. It is, moreover, absolutely direct; the reader always knows what his authors mean to say; and that is a quality which will give it a wide appeal among laymen, and make it of special use at Public Schools, whether for girls or boys. Finally, it is a call to theologians to return once more to the historical fountain-head from which our religion springs, and consider afresh whether, in the apparent conflict which it discloses between Christ and the modern world, it is not rather He who is right.

E. G. SELWYN.

NOTICES

CREDO ECCLESIAM. Essays presented to D. Wilhelm Zoellner, General Superintendent of the Evangelical Church in Westphalia, on his seventieth birthday. Edited by Hans Ehrenberg. C. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh. 18 Mk.

It is a sign of the times that German scholars and pastors are paying far more attention to the Church than they did before the War. This

change of attitude is, no doubt, partly caused by the fact that the disestablishment of the State or provincial churches has forced the Protestant communities to stand upon their own feet and to take steps to strengthen their organization, in order to compete effectively with the centralized system of the Roman Church. They have realized that an individualistic, non-institutional religion has little driving force, and is unable to exercise much social or moral influence on the community. So it might be said that from many quarters the cry is raised, "Back to the Church." Let us try to discover its essential character and permanent value.

This present study is divided into three principal parts: (1) The historical foundation of ecclesiology. (2) The practical accomplishment of ecclesiology. (3) The theoretical verification of ecclesiology.

As we would naturally expect, the starting-point of the historical survey of the Church is not the New Testament, but the Confession of Augsburg and the Apology. These documents show very clearly what they conceive the functions of the Church to be in relation to the State. Both the C.A. and the Apology emphasize the kingdom of Christ and the civil kingdom, the ecclesiastical and the civil powers. But it was never Luther's plan to subordinate the Church to the State; his one aim was to free the Church from the domination of the Pope. The opposition of the Reformers to the bishops' hierarchical authority led them to draw the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church.

We can now turn back to the biblical or apostolic belief in the Church. There are, of course, three uses of the word "Church" in the N.T.: (1) congregation, (2) body, (3) building. So the Church is holy and indestructible in spite of its permanent connection with, and the continuous activity of, the unholy.

This combination of moral qualities gives us the clue to Luther's doctrine of the Church, which is composed of four elements: (1) The omnipotence of God in the Church. (2) The co-operation of God with men through the Holy Spirit. (3) The fruits of the Holy spirit. (4) The Devil in the Church. Even the spirit of evil must in the last resort serve the Church, and the fundamental dualism of good and evil must be overcome.

The practical activities of the Church are twofold, prayer and service. The *Ecclesia militans* is the *Ecclesia orans* and the *Ecclesia ancilla*. The work of the Church consists in the official ministry of deacons and deaconesses, or the pioneer efforts of the Home Mission. Its moral and religious energies must be applied to all ages, old and young, and to all classes of society. Every civilized nation is faced with the same economic and social problem, the divorce of the masses from any form of organized religion, and the vigorous propaganda of Communist teachers and workers. We cannot deal with these social conditions by passive acquiescence or negative denunciation, but we must demonstrate by deeds, not words, that the Church has a positive remedy for these social disorders. The *Ecclesia militans* must offer a determined resistance to the destructive forces of materialistic science, rationalistic criticism, and extravagant sectarianism.

Any theory or doctrine of the Church must attempt to answer the following questions: What is the relation of the One Church to the many churches, and what is the relation of the Church to human society as a whole? We believe in One Holy Church, but where is it to be found? The conceptions of the unity of the Church held by the Roman Catholic,

Orthodox, and Anglican are all slightly different. The Church at present contains only a small proportion of human beings, even in civilized countries. How and when are the kingdoms of this world to become the kingdom of God and of His Christ? The Church must be able to show that its ideals of life are far better than the ideals of the world. The *Ecclesia militans* should be the *Ecclesia docens*, if it is to convert the rest of human society.

This interesting volume of essays closes with Dr. W. Zoellner's personal confession of faith in the Church.

L. PATTERSON.

THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET EZEKIEL: A NEW INTERPRETATION. By James Smith. With a foreword by Professor W. O. E. Oesterley. S.P.C.K. 5s.

The Book of Ezekiel is the last of the great prophetic collections to receive the close attention of the scholar and the critic. It is to be feared that the general readiness to accept it as the work of one Babylonian prophet throughout has been partly due to a lack of interest. But this weakness is now being remedied, and the drastic criticism of Hölscher has at least prepared the way for further studies. Among these studies, Dr. Smith's work must hold an important place.

His conclusions may be briefly summarized as follows. The Book of Ezekiel "is in the main a compilation of two sets of oracles, the majority of which . . . emanated from Palestine." The author of both sets (later combined by a redactor) was a North Israelite, speaking and writing during the reigns of Shalmaneser V., Sargon, Sennacherib, and Esarhaddon. He may have been the priest brought back from Assyria to teach the colonists how to worship Yahweh.

The reasons which have led Dr. Smith to this result are worked out with great care, and with a scholarly thoroughness, though it must be admitted that a good deal more weight is laid on psychological probability than that type of argument will stand. Dr. Smith is much more convincing in his maintenance of a northern origin for Ezekiel than in his dating, and there are several critical objections which he will have to meet before his views find general acceptance—e.g., the relation between Ezekiel and Jeremiah. But even those readers who cannot follow him throughout his argument will welcome his careful study of the subject, and recognize in it a very valuable contribution to our knowledge of the Old Testament.

One comment may be made on the printing of the book. Dr. Smith naturally has to make frequent reference to the Hebrew text, and, except on p. 70, these references are transliterated. This is doubtless due to the need for economy in printing, and may be inevitable. But it is undesirable, for the reader who is unfamiliar with Hebrew is usually none the wiser, and the rest will find the practice irritating, especially since the vowel quantities are not clearly distinguished. This, however, is a small point, and should not be allowed to detract from the undoubted merits of the book as a whole.

T. H. ROBINSON.

AN ISLAND BISHOP, 1762-1838. Memorials of William Ward, D.D. Bishop of Sodor and Man, 1828-1838. Compiled by his granddaughter, Edith Caroline Wilson. S.P.C.K. 6s.

This interesting compilation forms a valuable addition to the history of the Diocese of Sodor and Man, and will doubtless receive the warmest possible welcome from all Manx Churchmen and all lovers of the island.

The book is, however, of far more than local interest, and should not be overlooked by students of the history of the English Church during the last one hundred years. Its appearance with the approaching centenary of the Oxford Movement is indeed most opportune.

The Bishop who fought gallantly for the preservation of his Diocese from its threatened absorption with that of Carlisle was a friend of the early Tractarians, and had a high conception of the duties of the Priesthood and Episcopate. It is true that he held at one and the same time the Bishopric, the Rectory of Great Horkesley, and a Prebendal Stall in Salisbury Cathedral, nevertheless he discharged the duties of his several offices with ability and devotion.

Holy Communion was celebrated both at Myland, where Ward was Rector, 1805-1818, and Great Horkesley, 1818-1838, but four times a year—Christmas, Easter, Whit Sunday, and a Sunday near Michaelmas Day—but the Bishop was ready to administer the Holy Sacrament to the sick at all times. Absolution he regarded as not merely a declaration of God's willingness to forgive, but also as "an actual conveyance of pardon to the soul of the penitent believers." Ward believed the day would come when his "dear Catholic Brethren and Countrymen," the Roman Catholics of Ireland, "will be joined with us in heart and head." He complained that the mistake "people make in arguing with Roman Catholics is that they are too eager to find out points of difference, whereas they ought first of all to find out those points on which they agree . . . how nearly, in short, the Church of England agrees with the Church of Rome."

The Bishop was a real Father in God to his Diocese, continually planning for his people's spiritual welfare, and, in the words of a contemporary, he was "especially attentive to their wants in the exercise of his duty in admitting to orders." He found the Diocese in a shocking state of clerical poverty and ruined churches, and set himself the task of raising £12,000 for church building, and occupied himself with a scheme for raising the incomes of the clergy. Prayers were regularly and devoutly said in the Bishop's Chapel, which soon became a model of devotion to the island. The mitre was evidently used at the enthronement. Prizes were awarded by the Bishop each year for the pupils of King William's College, Isle of Man, which he founded. The prize in 1837, Bingham's *Antiquities of the Christian Church*, was awarded for an essay "on the right use of primitive tradition, verified as Catholic by the rule *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*."

There are but few errors in the book. "Duke of Devonshire," on p. 79, should read "Earl of Buckinghamshire." An index would have been useful.

Many will be grateful to Miss E. C. Wilson for having rescued from comparative oblivion the memory of a great churchman, and thrown some interesting sidelights on an important epoch of Church History.

R. D. MIDDLETON.

I AM OF APOLLOS. By A. J. Walker, M.A. Williams and Norgate. 5s.
THE RECORD OF THE LOVED DISCIPLE. By E. S. Hoernle, I.C.S. Blackwell. 8s. 6d.

Here are two books proposing new views on Christian origins, by writers who are not professional New Testament scholars. Mr. Walker finds in the Synoptists evidence of a "Johannite" literature preceding

them, and "Johannite" organization only partly merged in the Pentecostal Church. Mr. Hoernle, with work on *Æschylus* to his credit, took advantage of a time of disablement to attack the problem of the Fourth Gospel. He claims, on lines of source-criticism, to disentangle a pre-Markan gospel, by the Loved Disciple.

This is getting results with a vengeance, and the authors must be prepared for scepticism. Let it be said, however, that students will read them with profit, since they stimulate if they do not convince. I do not think that they establish their theses.

Mr. Walker's clue is Apollos. He thinks Apollos only knew Jesus as the hero who came forward to vindicate John after his martyrdom. Why then, we ask, was Apollos at once in demand in Achaia, as an apologist for the Messiahship of Jesus? Moreover, to find this view of Jesus behind the gospels, Mr. Walker has to attribute to the Synoptists a technique of fantastic subtlety, tendencious to a degree. He translates phrases and interprets situations in ways more ingenious than natural. But withal he stirs thought about the relation of Jesus to John.

Mr. Hoernle discriminates two different mentalities in the Fourth Gospel. A crudely thaumaturgic life is the measure of one, and matchless spiritual artistry the other. From this beginning, hypotheses branch out and out, circumventing every unaccommodating fact. The author sees corroboration everywhere (sometimes with half an eye, as in the argument from Celsus, p. 73, which could not have been written if the passage had been looked up).

It remains that Streeter, *Four Gospels*, p. 377, is adequate criticism of all such "quests for sources."

W. TELFER.

THE REVELATION OF DEITY. By J. E. Turner, Ph.D. Allen and Unwin. 8s. 6d.

In this volume Dr. Turner has developed the ideas which he has previously given to us in *Personality and Reality* and *The Nature of Deity* by considering their application to Revelation. However, as is stated in the preface, this new volume can be read independently of the other two. And it is well that this is so. For the book is primarily theological and not merely philosophical in purpose; and the intending reader must be warned to allow neither the somewhat repelling title of the book nor the philosophical character of its early chapters to deter him from persevering to the end. It is in the last two chapters that Dr. Turner gives us his illuminating treatment of the Incarnation as the fulfilment of Creation regarded as the Revelation of God.

Beginning with some general considerations of perfection, knowledge, transcendence, etc., the author proceeds to the consideration of the Universe from the different standpoints of mechanism, art, and morality. Yet, although they are different, these standpoints are not fundamentally antagonistic. On the contrary, in their highest development, art and mechanism are seen to have much in common. Again, we are rightly forbidden to acquiesce in the facile and popular assumption that morality is opposed to art (especially art with a capital A!). Conventional pseudo-morality may oppose itself to true art, while true morality must always oppose itself to the pseudo-genius who raises a cheap laugh by ridiculing the ideals of others as the refuge of mediocrity. True morality must mean self-expression in accordance with the highest ideals, and therefore

cannot be opposed to the expressions of the highest ideals in art or in the search for knowledge. There are some interesting suggestions concerning mechanism as the medium for the expression of purpose. Greater complexity means more and not less efficacy of expression, just as the great artist combines great executive ability with the highest æsthetic ideals. And so we are led on to the idea that the highest expression of Purpose must combine the characteristics of a work of art, of a mechanism, and of morality.

In his remarks on Creation, Dr. Turner is perhaps less happy in the effect he may produce on some of his readers. Much light is no doubt thrown on the relation of God to Creation by the consideration of our own struggles to express our highest ideals through our environment. But with God there can be no analogy with our *struggle* to express ourselves; and with James Ward we must be prepared to say that "the idea of creation, like the idea of God, we admit is altogether transcendent." There can be no complete analogy to Creation in our experience.

It is in our failure to achieve anything like an adequate expression of our ideals that the need for intervention from without is appreciated. The ideals must be expressed, for this is the purpose of Creation and life. So God Himself in the person of the Incarnate Lord remedies the failure of humanity, without in the least destroying human responsibility for failure. The reader must be referred to the actual book to read for himself Dr. Turner's skilful treatment of the problems of the Incarnation and Atonement.

C. D. WADDAMS.

THE WELL-SPRINGS (Les Sources). By Alphonse Gratry. Translated by Stephen J. Brown, S.J. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 5s.

"How the thinker and writer may secure the conditions in which the mind can work at its best; what are the qualities and dispositions . . . which are the best preparation . . . what are the subjects of study best suited to a mind bent on self-culture with a view to the intellectual life." This is the theme, according to the introduction. A typical product of nineteenth-century France, apparently still much appreciated by Latin and German Catholics. One wonders why. Written in a maddeningly hortatory style, verbose, vague, concerned chiefly with "general uplift." The translator allows for certain faults: "the tendency to follow up an idea to its utmost logical consequences . . . a failure to temper his ideals by constant reference to the actual facts. . . . These faults must not be allowed to detract unduly from the value of the noble ideals and fecund thoughts. The splendid élan, fervour of optimism, lofty ideals, the appealing eloquence"—unfortunately none of these are apparent to a twentieth-century English reader. The utterances of an inspiring personality did their work in a particular milieu in the last century, and may still prove useful in circles where that atmosphere is cultivated. Not to mince matters, the work is dull, with a tedium that a good translation cannot redeem.

V. I. RUFFER.

BOOK NOTES

Personal Discipleship and the Way of Prayer. By J. C. H. How. Longmans. 2s. 6d. A Lent book with a good deal more "meat" in it than is found in many such books, by the Rector of Liverpool. Everything is firmly based upon Scripture.

The Sermon on the Mount. By C. G. Chappell. Williams and Norgate. 5s. This may be recommended to those who wish to see how a talented American preaches a course of sermons on this subject. They could not be used as they stand for an Anglican congregation, and for that very reason, since they need mental effort to adapt them suitably, are better fitted for the purpose of suggesting sermons than a book which could be "lifted" as it stands.

The Sacristan's Handbook. By E. Hermitage Day, D.D. Mowbray. 2s. 6d. A charming little book on "English Use" lines, omitting a good deal which should be left to the discretion of the parish priest.

A Scrap-Book of Prayer. By T. Dilworth-Harrison. Mowbray. 1s. 6d. This is described as "a simple guide for those who want to pray better"; in its colloquial, almost scrappy, way it will appeal to those who are somewhat repelled by more formal treatises.

A Good Warfare. By B. Griffin. Mowbray. 2s. 6d. These "addresses to boys and girls from Septuagesima to Easter" (the last, however, is for Good Friday) will do very well for sermons to ordinary congregations. In the average parish there is no opportunity for giving such sermons to adolescents.

The Diurnal. After the use of the illustrious Church of Salisbury. Edited by G. H. Palmer, Mus.Doc. Oxford University Press. 6s. A reprint of a book which appeared first in 1921, in which an alternative form of Prime and the office of Tenebræ have been added.

The Story of England's Churches. By W. E. Bloss. Mowbray. 10s. 6d. This is an interesting book on a familiar subject, popular in style and laying stress on the historical background of the buildings described. For example, the Saxon period, unimportant architecturally, has nearly one-third of the space. Information is given about gilds, chantries, and shrines, and about the financial background of architecture. There are twenty-nine full-page illustrations.

The English Parish Church. By A. R. Powys. Longmans. 3s. 6d. The Secretary of the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Buildings has lived to see his principles generally accepted. If they are flagrantly violated, it is with an ill conscience. Those who have opposed him have felt that the Society wanted to keep the churches as monuments and museums without due regard to their living use in the present. In this wise and gracious little book Mr. Powys disarms such suspicions and shows a reasonable consideration for our needs, which after all may be only temporary. Very skilfully he breaks away from the conventional method of treatment and gives us the human background of the parish church.

The Gospel according to St. John. Longmans, Green and Co. 3s. 6d. The merits of the Westminster Version of the New Testament, of which this forms a *fasciculus*, are widely recognized. The Roman Catholics are building up their own R.V. or "Moffatt" carefully and slowly, on very sound lines. The translation, by Dr. W. S. Reilly of Baltimore, is very good. The author uses sound "Biblical" English and never gives way to the temptation of improving the original for the benefit of his readers. Consequently the translation deserves the highest meed of praise in that the reader who knows no Greek receives substantially the same impression as the scholar who studies the original. There is a competent introduction, and good short notes are added.

Eucharistic Meditations for the Sundays and Saints' Days of the Year. By G. Sampson, C.R. 2s. The dominant thought of the feast is brought into relation with the Eucharist.

Devotion and Duty. By E. E. Seyzinger, C.R. 2s. A very useful little book, one half of which is instructions on drawing up and keeping a rule of life, the other half devotions, including a scheme of intercession.

Pulpits and Personalities. By The Janitor. Duckworth. 5s. A clever journalist here describes St. Martin-in-the-Fields; All Saints', Margaret Street; Holy Trinity, Brompton; St. Peter's, Great Windmill Street; St. Paul's, Portman Square; St. Mark's, North Audley Street; St. Augustine's, Haggerston ("the Church rebellious"); All Hallows', Barking; Christ Church, Lancaster Gate; All Souls', Langham Place; and The King's Weigh House—with their clergy. With much sympathy, and insight (into externals!), he yet leaves the impression of a chaotic Church faced with which a foreigner would gasp: *Quelle religion! quelle Église!* Yet he ends on a note of hope, that the present travail may lead to better things. The book presents, in terms of the problem as it appears to a wandering churchgoer in London, issues which are continually in the minds of the clergy.

The Gospels: A Short Introduction. By V. Taylor, D.D. The Epworth Press. 2s. 6d. An up-to-date short handbook to the Gospels was much needed, and few are so capable of supplying it as Dr. Taylor. Practically all the books cited are post-war, a useful reminder of the pace at which research moves nowadays. Full justice is done to the *formgeschichtlich* school and to the Proto-Luke hypothesis. On p. 122 it is pointed out that of British writers on the Fourth Gospel since 1920 only one—Dr. C. F. Nolloth—holds that the son of Zebedee was the author. He is referring only to the more considerable works, and the modest size and price of Mr. Nunn's book on *The Son of Zebedee* have perhaps led him to neglect a very solid piece of work on the conservative side.

W. K. L. C.

The Melody of Life: A Book of Meditations. By Father Andrew, S.D.C. Mowbrays. 3s. 6d. This is not a book to be read through, but pondered over in small sections. If the thoughts noted down here for others' use are not strikingly original, they are certainly not trivial—they are simple, but often amazingly vivid. They are probably meant chiefly for those who cannot, or who are not accustomed to produce their own meditations unaided, but their usefulness will by no means be restricted to beginners. It would be good to read them early in the day, and go on thinking them out, thinking them further during the day or even the week—and the thought they will stimulate will be prayerful rather than speculative.

The House of the Soul. By Evelyn Underhill. Methuen. 2s. This book is not worthy of Miss Underhill's pen. The idea of presenting the spiritual life under the likeness of a house and housekeeping is, to begin with, arresting, but in these notes it is far too elaborately and mercilessly worked out, and becomes monotonous and at times irritatingly "clever." But the advice given is eminently sound, though the form in which it is presented may foster in some of its most devoted admirers a tendency to affectation—which it is pre-eminently the book's purpose to combat.

Thoughts for Meditation. Second Series. By Mother Clare Fey. Translated from German MSS. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 6s. These meditations were given by the Foundress and Superior of the Con-

gregation of the Poor Child Jesus to her Religious, who are devoted to educational work among poor children. This series consists of thoughts on The Holy Name (mostly Titles from Isaiah), the Litany of the Holy Name, the Hidden Life of our Lord, and a number of unconnected texts. They are simple and devout, but they do not penetrate fresh depths or wide ranges of spirituality, and will be chiefly useful for uneducated people. The translation seems to be correct, but is singularly colourless, and makes one realize how very much, in the matter of style, even the least profound of Anglican writers owes to the Authorized and Revised Versions of the Bible.

St. Augustine: A Study in his Personal Religion. By Eleanor McDougall. S.C.M. Press. 3s. 6d. The author is the Principal of the Women's Christian College, Madras, and interprets St. Augustine's religion in terms of Bhakti—i.e., Hindu religious devotion. There are four chapters: I. The Times of St. Augustine, a very cursory survey written with that lack of sympathy with which Protestants are apt to approach early Church history; II. The Conversion, a kind of commentary on the Confessions; III. The Later Life; IV. The Bhakti of St. Augustine. It will be exceedingly useful to those Nonconformists who fight shy of Anglican writing. To Churchpeople it can make little appeal: those who know anything about St. Augustine will find it too elementary, those who know nothing will be much better advised to obtain the *Confessions* themselves in an edition with a good introduction.

V. I. R.

At the Sign of the Flying Angel. By G. A. Gollock. Longmans. 5s. The matter in this book is so tightly packed that in less skilful hands it would not have made easy reading. To get into 240 pages a brief history of the British Merchant Service and its conditions, the changes made in life afloat by the transition from sail to steam (the last British deep-water sailing ship was launched in 1905), the foundation in 1856 of the Missions to Seamen, with an account of their institutes all over the world, is no small undertaking. But Miss Gollock accomplishes it, and has room to throw in thumbnail sketches of the chaplains as well, men who were as good sailors as those among whom they worked—"Jim Fell, the man who cleaned up Frisco"; the diplomatist who at a crossroad in Rangoon sorted out twenty-five Australian sailors from fifteen native cabmen who knew no word of each other's language or wants; the linguist who saved a Moslem Lascar at Hamburg from a diet of "the most nourishing and beautiful pork." But in peace or war, on lightship or liner, the chaplain is first of all a fisher of men, and the crowded little chapels at the institutes, or the welcome to services on board, show that the fish are more than ready to be caught.

The Gospel according to St. Mark. By the Very Rev. M. J. Lagrange, O.P. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 5s. Internal evidence shows this authorized translation to have been made by an American. The little book is well planned for what would be with us the Sunday School teacher public, with a short introduction followed by the text, each section being dealt with in a short expository chapter. Apart from its Roman outlook it is not likely to be of much use to Anglicans. The greatest concession to criticism is the statement that almost every section has its parallel in Matthew, but Mark "is far from being Matthew's abbreviator." xvi. 9-20 is difficult, but "is canonical and inspired." The sections in

the main body of the book are often devout, sometimes they give a touch of local colour, and sometimes deal with the milder type of "Rationalist critics." But they are not very imaginative. On xii. 16, for instance, "Jesus speaks as if he had never seen a denarius, at all events he had none with him."

M. D. R. W.

Francis James Chavasse. By J. B. Lancelot. Blackwell. 3s. 6d. A cheap reprint of this admirable biography of a bishop whom Mr. Baldwin coupled with Edward King in his speech on the Revised Prayer Book—"two saints if ever there were saints."

Progress and Religion. By Christopher Dawson. Sheed and Ward. 3s. 6d. Another valuable cheap reprint of a book which Dr. Inge has called "a great work."

Science and Faith. By Paul B. Bull. Faith Press. 2s. This little book is packed full of quotations from recent writers. It is largely a reply to Sir Arthur Keith's recent exposition of materialism and will be very useful to clergy and others if used with discretion. The danger of such books is that their zealous defence of the faith sometimes arouses opposition in those who pride themselves on being open-minded. Thus the method of the unbelieving scientist is here exemplified by a supposed student of the Inner Circle who treated it as a closed system without allowing for the irruption of trains from Richmond, Wimbledon, etc. Without being able to explain his feeling, the reader may be left with a vague sense of unfairness.

National Apostasy. Mowbray. 6d. John Keble's famous sermon of July 14, 1833, which is generally taken to mark the beginning of the Oxford Movement, is reprinted with an introductory note quoted from Canon Ollard's *History of the Movement*. It is safe to say that it arouses no interest now other than historical, which of course is very great.

The Christian Life. By K. Barth. S.C.M. Press. 1s. 6d. This translation of a Bible study given to a Students' Christian Union will be useful as a very simple introduction to Barth's teaching, or rather to the devotional fruit of his teaching. In itself it is not so helpful as one might expect from the writer's reputation.

Preparation for Holy Matrimony. By B. M. Hancock. Allen and Unwin. 2s. A revised edition of a little handbook which the Mothers' Union has found helpful. It contains much sane and wise advice on a high level of idealism. It is rather fragmentary in plan and contains perhaps an excessive number of quotations. A letter purporting to be written by a bishop is included—not a happy literary device. And a form of application for the publication of Banns authorized by Bishop Gore for the diocese of Birmingham, printed on pp. 76, 77, is out of place in a book reissued in 1930.

A Handbook for Church School Managers, by Canon W. J. Brown (Mowbray, 9d.), will be very useful.

The Mantle of Prayer. By G. Harwood and A. W. Hopkinson. Mowbray. 3s. 6d. Though other features are introduced, the main idea is to reprint substantial portions of Bishop Andrewes' Devotions in an attractive form. We cannot have too many editions of this classic.

W. K. L. C.